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1. SUMMARY: Resp was convicted of three counts of transporting aliens who 
were illegally present in this country, 8 USC §1324(a)(2), and was sentenced to six 
months incarceration followed by three years probation. He had been stopped at a 
out 
fixed checkpoint and his vehicle had been searched with/probable cause. Three illegal 
~
aliens were found. CA 9 reversed on authority of United States v. Bowen, F. 2d __ , 
\__., cert pending No. 73-6848, Summer List 14/2. There by a vote of 7-6 CA 9 ruled en 




border patrol searches for illegal aliens may not be c t ducte witho J t probab e cause, 
applied also to fixed checkpoint searches. The panel ~ere, also on author· y of Bowen, 
ruled that since the search in this case occurred after Almeida-Sanchez was decided, ___., -
although before Bowen was decided, the evidence must be suppressed. Without the 
aliens as evidence the government had no case, therefore CA 9 ordered the indictme11:t 
dismissed. 
~
The SG seeks cert claiming that Bowen and similar CA 5 and CA 10 decisions have 
incorrectly extended Almeida-Sanchez and have unduly hampered the administration of 
the alien entrance laws. The SG contends first, that probable cause in the traditional 
~
sense is not required for fixed checkpoint searches and that there need be no prior 
judicial acquiescence to fixed checkpoint searches. Second, if he is wrong on his first 
claim the SG claims CA 9 erred when it held Bowen applicable to all searches after 
Almeida-Sanchez. Since Bowen extended Almeida-Sanchez it should have been prospec -_ ___.. -
tive from its own date, not Almeida-Sanchez. 
2. FACTS: The San Clemente checkpoint is a permanent fixed Border Patrol 
facility located about 66 miles north of the border between Mexico and the United States. 
It is on a major highway between Los Angeles and San Diego. On the east is Camp 
Pendleton and on the west is the Pacific ocean. These barriers, combined with other 
fixed checkpoints, create an obstacle to aliens attempting to move north illegally. The 
San Clemente checkpoint is the "cornerstone" of the network. During a normal eight 
s 2 -30 aliens will be apprehended although only 3o/o of the vehicles 
A U.S. agent, in uniform stands next to the highway and 
signals cars to slow down. Then he sight checks the cars and beckons those over whic h ·--------
"break the pattern. 11 These cars are searched wherever aliens might hide, ~·, trunk, 
under rear seat. 
/ 
\. 
The primary purpose of the checkpoint is not apprehension of illegal aliens, it 
is deterrence. It is simple for aliens to walk across the b~rder itself. But to get .. ... 
north where the jobs await they must be transported by a smuggler. Only the smug-
glers have a decent chance of getting through the checkpoints. And the smugglers 
charge about $250 a head. Thus the size of the fee is dependent upon the existence of 
the checkpoints and is a deterrent to a Mexican would be border violator. 
Resp is a smuggler. On November 12, 1973, he was stopped at the San Clemente 
~~~
checkpoint and three aliens were found concealed in the trunk of his car. He was in-
dieted for transporting illegal aliens. Before trial he moved to suppress. Since there 
were several such motions pending in the Southern District of California at the time, 
they were consolidated before Judge Turrentine for a hearing on whether the fixed 
~JL. ·~ checkpoints violated Almeida -Sanchez. Judge Turrentine, in a thorough opinion, held _ ____. 
that the fixed checkpoints in the District, whether temporary or permanent, were the 
"functional equivalent" of the border and therefore passed muster under Almeida-
Sanchez. Resp was then tried and convicted. · 
On appeal CA 9 rever sed on the basis of Bowen, a 7-6 CA 9 decision which defined 
"functional equivalent" of a border search to be 
a location where virtually everyone searched has just 
come from the other side of the border, ••• [or if it 
can be said with]. reasonable certainty that the vehicle 
searched contained either goods which had just been 
smuggled or a person who had just crossed the border 
illegally. 
Clearly the San Clemente checkpoint,and the facts of the stop here .do not fulfill that 
definition. 
Although Bowen was decided in May 1974, and the search herein was conducted in 
( 
November 1973, the panel here held Bowen applicable because the Almeida-Sanchez 
'-r 
decision was rendered in June 1973. Bowen itself had applied this limited retroactiv ity . 
3. CONTENTIONS: (a) The SG does no contend that the San Clemente check oint 
( is the "functional equivalent" of the border. He agrees in general with the CA 9 defini-
tion. However, citing Mr. Justice Powell 1 s concurrence in Almeida -Sanchez the SG 
~ 
argues that the reasonableness of a search of an automobile for aliens does not neces-
. ! ( 
' 
sarily depend upon the existence of probable cause to believe an alien will be found in 
a certain automobile. Rather, a search may be reasonable if co:t?-ducted as part of an 
areawide pro ram of searches which is itself reasonable measured by the existence of 
a legitimate law enforcement need balanced against the extent of the intrusion. The SG 
submits that this constitutes a "constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause." 
413 U.S. at 279 (Mr. Justice Powell, concurring), 
Mr. Justice Powell concluded in Almeida-Sanchez that a prior judicial determina-
tion of the reasonableness was necessary for particular roving border searches. But 
for fixed checkpoint searches, the SG contends, prior judicial approval "would add 
little to the reasonableness of the, •• operations, and •• "' a subsequent judicial deter-
mination on a motion to suppress adequately protects Fourth Amendment values. 11 
Unlike roving patrols in lonely areas fixed checkpoint operations are highly visible 
because they are conducted on major thoroughfares. The vehicle inspection procedure 
is regularized and of course only those vehicles which approach the checkpoint are 
inspected. These factors decrease the opportunity for arbitrary conduct, and the need 
for periodic ex parte judicial supervision, In any case where a checkpoint does not 
operate fairly an individual may make a motion to suppress. 
Perhaps to flesh out the factual basis for his argument the SG states in a footnote 
) l \\ 
that the government has applied for and has been refused warrants to search for aliens 
at checkpoints in the Southern District of California, N. 6. Magistrates have been 
willing to is sue warrants permitting vehicle stops only for interrogation. The SG sur-
mises that the magistrates do not believe the Fourth Amendment allows issuance of 
general searc.Q. warrants on a checkpo1nt bas1s. C!. 4! 3 u.s. at t.IU, n • .5. 
Resp replies that the three CAs which have ruled on warrantless searches con-
ducted without probable cause at checkpoints not the functional equivalent of the borde r 
agree that Almeida-Sanchez invalidates such searches. · United States v. Speed, 497 
F. 2d ?46 ( CA 5, 1974); United States v. King, 485 F. 2d 353 ( CA 10, 1974); United 
States v. Maddox, 485 F. 2d 361 (CA 10, 1974). Since the government here concedes 
that the search was not conducted at the functional equivalent of the border and was not 
supported by probable cause, the search fails under Almeida-Sanchez. Moreover, the r e 
is no functional difference between fixed and roving stops for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. In both cases the opportunity for arbitrary conduct on the part of the 
officers is the same, and the lack of a prior judicial ruling on a specific search is 
present. 
(b) Second, the SG contends that even if his first argument is not accepted CA 9 
erred in applying the Bowen decision retroactively to the date of the Almeida -Sanchez 
decision. Bowen should apply only prospectively because it presents a "clear break 
with the past. 11 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248. Prior to Bowen, the SG 
claims, fixed checkpoint searches had been repeatedly and consistently upheld in CA 9. 
And the issue was specifically left open in Almeida-Sanchez. Moreover, the purposes 
behind the exclusionary rule are in no way advanced by imposing the sanction of sup-
pression against police activities conducted in good faith which were acceptable under 
statute and judicial decision at the time they occurred. Therefore under both retro-
activity principles and exclusionary rule principles Bowen should be applied pro spec-
tively. 
Resp argues that Almeida-Sanchez is far from a new constitutional rule. That 
case merely applied Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 to procedures which 
obviously violated its principles, and Bowen simply did the same thing to the fixed 
'.' 
checkpoint situation. Therefore retroactiVIty a:t lea--s-r to .A:Imeiaa -ua-ncnez :us JU:;;~n.~:ea.. 
4, DISCUSSION: (a) In 1963, 39, 000 aliens were apprehended in the U.S. by the 
-~ 
Border Patrol. By 1973, the figure had jumped to 498, 000 aliens. And for a variety 
...----
of reasons the increase should continue. See Appendix C of Petn. The SG contends 
that CAs have extended Almeida -Sanchez by applying it to fixed checkpoints and that 
the extension has severely hampered Border Patrol efforts to curb this influx of 
illegal aliens. The contention that Almeida -Sanchez has been extended seems correct 
because five members of the Court indicated that the fixed checkpoint issue was not in 
that case. LFP, 413 U.S. at 276; CJ, BRW, HAB, WHR, 413 U.S. ·at 288. The con-- -
tention that the extension has severely hampered law enforcement is bolstered by a 
DC findi.n:g that there is no "reasonable or effective alternative" to fixed checkpoints 
:Z:< 4~, 
to stop illegal aliens from entering from Mexico. App. at 20A. Moreover, the govern-
m ·ent is in a real bind because magistrates apparently refuse to issue general warrants 
which would allow effective alien searches at checkpoints. Thus the SG' s contention 
that the matter requires this Court's attention seems to have merit. 
The SG, however, does not assert a strong conflict on the issue of whether 
Almeida-Sanchez applies to fixed checkpoint searches. The CAs have been uniform 
in agreeing that it does with the exception of one panel of CA 5 which, in a petition for 
rehearing, stated that it made a difference that the defendant was stopped by a fixed 
checkpoint. United States v. DeLeon, No. S72-1052, Decided November 1, 1973. But 
in that case it is possible that the panel assumed the checkpoint to be the functional 
equivalent of the border since it was only ten mi~es away. 
There are other cases pending here dealing with Almeida -Sanchez problems, see 
the helpful compendium in the preliminary memo for Hendrix v. United States, No. 7 3 -
1896, SL 15/2. However, the is sue of whether Almeida -Sanchez applies to fixed check-
point searches is presented well here. The San Clemente checkpoint is the "corner-
,.._,,I 
.... . ' - 7 -
stone" checkpoint in the SD Cal. App. at 25A. It is permanent, and unless traffic 
( or weather prohibit, it operates continuously. And it cannot be considered the 
"functional equivalent" of the border. Moreover, the Bowen opinion is incorporated 
into this case since the reversal here is based solely on that decision. 
(b) There are several petitions here dealing with various retroactivity problems 
arising from Almeida-Sanchez, most notably United States v. Peltier, No. 73-2000, SL 
13/3, where CA 9 holds that Almeida-Sanchez applies to roving patrol cases pending on 
the date of decision. Of course the retroactivity issue in the instant case is dependent 
upon whether fixed checkpoints are somehow acceptable or not. It would seem, howeve r , 
that whatever principles are decided upon to settle the conflict between Peltier and 
Miller v. United States, (CA 5), No. 73-6975, (not listed as of 9/10/74)
1
would also 
settle the issue here. 
There is a response. 
( 
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A./ On October 151 the Court granted cert to CA 9 in this case to consider a que s-
tion involving roving border patrol searches. The Court also granted resp 1 s motion 
to proceed IFF. 
Resp now moves for the appointment of John J. Cleary of the Federal Defenders 
of San Diego, Inc. to represent him before the Court. The Federal Defenders' orga-
nization was appointed to represent resp in the USDC and CA. The organization is not 
funded by grant, but depends exclusively on payments under the Criminal Justice Act. 
Mr. Cleary is a member of the Bar of this Court. 
.. 
- 2 -
""": ' . 
It has been the Court1 s practice in similar cases to appoint Mr. Cleary, rather 
than the organization, as counsel to represent resp. 
B./ Pursuant to Rule 36(8), the SG moves to dispense with the requirement of 
an appendix. He states that the parties agree that the only items that need be printed 
are those reproduced in the appendix to the cert petition and that resp has agreed to 
the motion. 




re: United States v. Ortiz 
No. 73-2050 
United States v. Brigononi-Ponce 
No. 74-114 
AUTOMOBILE LICENSE CHECKS AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
By 
CHARLES c. AMES 
Reprint from Volume 60, No. 4 
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
01974 
January 24.7 1975 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 2 
No. 73-2050 Motion for Appointment of 
New Counsel 
On November 18, 19741 the Court appointed John J. Cleary, Executive Director 
of Federal Defenders of San Diego, to represent resp for the purpose of oral argument 
i n this Court. The appointment was made in response to a motion submitted by the 
c ommunity defender organization requesting that the organization be appointed to 
a ppear on behalf of resp and in keeping with the Court1 s practice of appointing a named 
a ttorney as opposed to a designated legal aid group to represent an indigent party befor e 
t he Court. 
Mr. Cleary now requests that the Court substitute Charles M. Sevoilla, Chief 





appears that Mr. Sevilla., who is a member of the bar of this Court, is the principal 
+c 
author of resp1 s brief and the attorney designated by his organizatio~argue orally 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: David Boyd DATE: February 11, 1975 
Border Search Cases 
These four cases present a number of issues which 
generally can be categorized as either Fourth Amendment questions 
or questions of retroactivity. The general categories of 
questions are related, however, and the nature and number of 
retroactivity issues that the Court will have to decide 
will depend on the resolution of the Fourth Amendment questions. 
I consider all of the retroactivity issues to be relatively 
simple matters. As you are well aware, the Fourth Amendment 
issues are far from easy and your vote will probably determine 
their outcome. 
This memorandum is broken into parts. Part I simply 
outlines the questions and the factual variations presented 
by each of the four cases. In view of the similarity of some 
of the issues and fact patterns, I thought this simple 
scorecard might help us both keep the cases straight. Part II 
briefly discusses the retroactivity issues. While it is perhaps 
somewhat illogical to discuss these issues in advance of 
the resolution of the Fourth Amendment questions, I have 
2. 
proceeded in this manner largely because I can offer a more 
definitive opinion on the retroactivity questions. On the 
Fourth Amendment issues, I can offer only thoughts and 
speculations at this time. Hopefully we can formulate a more 
concrete position in advance of conference. 
!-Summary of the Cases Presented: 
In view of the number of cases that present similar 
but discrete issues in slightly dissimilar factual e ontexts, 
it might be helpful by beginning with a brief review of the 
facts of Almeida Sanchez and of the facts of each of the cases 
under consideration and the questions they present. 
Almeida Sanchez: 
The search at issue was conducted pursuant to a 
"roving patrol", which you essentially characterized as a 
search made pursuant to a decision that was not "supported 
by probable cause in the sense of specific knowledge about 
a particular automobile." 413 U.S. at 281. The search 
occurred on an east-west highway located some 20 to 25 miles 
north of the border. All agreed that this could not be 
considered the "funct ional equivalent" of the border and 




United States v. Peltier, No. 73-2000: 
The sole question presented by this case is whether 
the Court's decision in Almeida Sanchez is to be applied 
retroactively. 
Facts: Officials conducting what the Solicitor 
General concedes to have been a roving immigration patrol .. ~
during the early morning hours, spotted respondent's car 
proceeding north at a point some 70 miles north of the border. 
The agents knew that the road was frequently used by 
smugglers of aliens, and were suspicious because respondent's 
car was old and because respondent appeared to be of Mexican 
descent. The officials requested to examine the trunk, 
and discovered marijuana. The Solicitor General does 
not assert in this case that traditional cause existed 
for the stop. That kind of claim is made in Brigoni-Ponce. 
United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, No. 74-114: 
The question presented in this case is whether agents 
can conduct a warrantless stop of a vehicle in the "border 
area" for the purpose of questioning its occupants about 
their nationality and right to be in the United States. 
Facts: Petitioners were stopped on the open highway 
some four miles south of San Clemente and 58 miles north 
of the border. The San Clemente fixed checkpoint was closed 
4. 
due to inclement weather, and this automobile was stopped 
because the agents noticed that its occupants looked Mexican. 
No search was required. The questioning alone indicated 
that some of the occupants were illegal aliens, and all were 
arrested. 
Bowen v. United States, No. 73-6848: 
This case potentially presents two kinds of issues. 
The first question is whether the Fourth Amendment authorizes 
a search of an automobile for aliens, conducted at a fixed 
immigration checkpoint without a warrant and without 
particularized probable cause. The Government argues this issue 
more thoroughly in Ortiz. If the Court determines that it 
does not, retroactivity questions are presented, the most 
significant of which is whether this ruling should apply to 
searches conducted before the Court's decision in Almeida. 
Facts: Petitioner was stopped at a fixed checkpoint 
located 36 air miles and 49 road miles north of the Mexican 
border. Agents' testimony indicates that they noticed nothing 
unusual about petitioner or his vehicle. At the time, they 
were stopping all vehicles except those occupied by persons they 
knew. After petitioner identified himself to be a United 
States citizen, agents r equested to inspect the inside of 
his "camper" attachment to his pickup truck. When the camper 
5. 
was opened\, agents noticed the strong scent of marijuana. 
Entry into the camper and minor additional inspection revealed 
the marijuana in plain view. 
United States v. Ortiz, No. 73-2050: 
In this case the Government fully develops their 
position that the Fourth Amendment tolerates warrantless 
searches of automobiles without particularized probable 
cause if conducted at fixed irmnigration checkpoints. The 
case also presents a potential issue of retroactivity: 
whether the decision should apply to invalidate searches 
conducted prior to the Ninth Circuit's!:.!!: bane decision in 
Bowen o 
Facts: Respondent, a United States citizen of 
Mexican descent, was stopped at the permanent checkpoint 
at San Clemente, some 62 miles north of the border. He 
was directed to a side area and agents searched the trunk of 
his car. The search revealed three aliens o 
II- Retroactivity Problems: 
The most obvious retroactivity question to consider 
first is the question of the retroactivi+y of Almeida Sanchez 
to cases of a similar nature. That is the only issue presentee 
in Peltier. 
The parties generally agree that the threshhold issue is 
.1. 
whether this Court's retroactivity decisions apply at all. That 
..... 
question turns on whether Almeida Sanchez "marks a sharp 
break in the law" by "overrul[ing] clear past precedent ••. 
or distupt[ing] a practice long accepted and widely relied 
on." Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381-382, n.2 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). The basic standard is reflected in Justice 
White's recent opinion in Daniels v. Lousiana( which you joined) 
and Justice Blackmun's opinion in Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 
672-672 (1973) . (which you also joined). In making this 
basic assessment, the inquiry must focus on the practical 
"fact[s] of legallife,''Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S., at 199 
(you joined), one mf which is the assumption that officials will 
rely on legally enacted statu tes unti 1 they are abrogated by 
the judiciary. Id. Finally, the Court's opinion in Chevron 
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, establishes that lower court 
precedent can be considered in determining whether clear past 
precedent existed. 
I think that the Ninth Circuit's determination that the 
Almeida secision neither overrules clear past precedent nor 
disrupts long accepted practice flies in the face of your concur-
ring opinion, 413 U.S., at 278, and Justice White's dissent. 
d 289 10 The court of appeals' view also is inconsistent L·, at , n. o 
with the rather pragmatic approach repreatedly e spoused by this 
eourt, a pragmatism that would seem particularly appropriate 
in this case. As you have recognized in Schnechcloth and your 
opinion for the Court in Calandra, the exclusionary rule serves primaril 
a prophylactic effect. Prophylaxis can only operate in futuro. 
I therefore think that your view on this issue is largely 
dictated by your past opinions and should be that Almeida does 
not require exclusion of evidence obtained in searches conducted 
before that decision was announced. 
The question of the a pplicability of an Almeida-type 
llinitation on fixed checkpoint searches and on warrantless stops 
for request of documentation of nationality is slightly more 
complicated, requiring the additional consideration , ~£ the 
extent to which the Court's decision in Almeida should have 
affected other kinds of border searches conducted after that 
time. Again, in view of your careful indication that the plurality 
opinion did not necessarily resolve those questions and Justice 
White's dissenting opinion, the continuation of the fixed 
checkpoint practice does not appear to be unreasonable. 
_prophylactic 
That, combined with the limite~value to be served by 
applying the exclusionary rule retroactively persuades me that 
any decisions governing warrantless document stops and fixed 
checkpoint searches should be prospective . Of course, the present 
composition of the Court makes it quite likely that that issue 
will not arise; the vote appears to be at least 4-3 to uphold 
the fixed checkpoint practice. 
II- The Fourth Amendment Issues 
Fixed Checkpoint Search: 
The Doctunent Stop and the 
In the not so short space of an evening, my thinking on 
the warrantless stop issue in Brignoni-Ponce has evolved to 
a posture that repr esents a more cautious view of the case if 
not a rejection of my previous thoughts. My thinking on the 
fixed checkpoint issue remains substantially unchanged,however. 
Since the two are in some sense related, I will begin by identify-
ing my view of the relationship between these two cases and 
Almeida. 
Although Almeida is technically a stop and search case, 
the analysis is focused on the search aspect. Justice Stewart's 
opinion refers at some points to the stop and search , see 413 
U.S., at 267-269, but he indicates that the Government did not 
assert the existence of any "reasonable suspicion" analogous 
to that found in Terry and he makes no significant reference to 
considerations that might justify a stop for more limited 
purposes than the search there involved. Likewise your opinion 
centers on probable cause to conduct searches, and your discussion 
of Terry treats only that aspect of the case. Id o, at 280. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the considerations surrounding the 
nature and circtunstances of the stop are important in distinguish-
ing Almeida from the checkpoint searches o I further think that 
the issue presented in Brignoni-Ponce, the warrantless stop for 
the limited purpose of inquiry into citizenship, must be 
viewed in relation to the spectrtun of cases from Almeida to Ortiz. 
I continue to think that the real distinguishing 
characteristic between Almeida's roving patrol searches 
and those that occur at fixed checkpoints is to be found in 
the circumstances that surround the initial stop and 
confrontation with officialdom. In each case the scope of 
the resulting search is essentially the same. Moreover, it 
seems difficult to exact a great deal of mileage from the 
difference in discretion initially vested in the official 
who determines whether the search is to be conducted. In the 
context of the roving patrol, the officer must make an initial 
determination to pull a car over to conduct a search. At the 
fixed checkpoint the official must make a similar initial 
determination to refer an automobile over to the side for 
a similar inspection. While the decision in the latter case 
may be somewhat mare informed, I doubt whether the two are 
distinguishable in any practical sense. The degree of discretion 
to sele .t certain automobiles for search is largely identical. 
Thus the distinction between the roving patrol search and the 
fixed checkpoint search ironically relates to the circumstances 
surrounding the stop rather than the search. In the context of 
the roving patrol, the stop generally is totally unexpected and 
is announced only by a £lasing light (as counsel pointed out, 
the same basic kind of equipment used by Carl Chessman) o At 
the fixed checkpoint, by contrast, the stop is preceded by 
location of 
more visible and reliable signs of authority. The/station 
generally is announced by signs and lights, the stopping officer 
is uniformed and visible from the initial moments, and the overall 
atmosphere is conducive to producing a greater feeling of 
security that the encounter that is to follow is entirely 
1 
official and legi timate. 
The importance of this distinction stems from the fact 
that the nature and degree of probable cause that might 
exist to support a warrant to conduct fixed checkpoint searches 
will be different and, more significantly, less powerful from 
the "functional equivalent of probable cause" you identified 
in Almeida. You described same of the considerations that 
would contribute to a finding of area probable cause 
to include·: tthe· following: 
[T]he frequency with which aliens illegally in the 
country are known or reasonably believed to be 
transported w~thin a particular area;(ii) the 
proximity of the area in question to the border; 
(iii) the extensiveness and geographic character-
istics of the area, including the roads therein 
and the extent of their use, and (iv) the probable 
degree of interference with the rights of innocent 
persons, taking into account the scope of the 
proposed search, its duration, and the concentration 
of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general 
traffic of the road or area. 413 U.S., at 284. 
It seems to me that one probably could not uphold a warrant to 
conduct a roving pat rol in the San Clemente vicinity, and I 
suspect that other fixed checkpoints would be equally difficult 
1. The same characteristics tend to distinguish the temporary 
checkpoint from the roving patrol and equate temporary checkpoints 
more more to f i xed checkpoints than to roving patrols o The opinion 
of the district court in Baca indicates that these general conditions 
obtain at temporary checkpoints as well as fixed checkpoints. Thus, the 
decision in Ortiz may largely decide the temporary checkpoint issue. 
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to uphold under this standard. Instead, the considerations 
that would support a decision to issue a warrant for operation 
of a fixed checkpoint would be somewhat different than thooe 
supporting a warrant to conduct roving patrol searches and, in 
my view, somewhat less demanding. And if that is true, the 
primary justification for imposing a less stringent functional 
equivalent of probable cause would relate to the less 
intrusive or less threatening nature of the preliminary 
encounter, the stop. 
If this factor is emphasized or even latent in the 
Ortiz opinion, it becomes difficult to envision how Ortiz and 
a broad stop permission in Brignoni would stand side by side. 
On the one hand, Ortiz would say, in effect, the less 
threatening nature of the stop attendant to the fixed check-
point search permits courts to demand somewhat less to satisfy 
the functional equivalent of probable cause than is required in 
Almaeida. On the other, Brignoni could only point to the absence 
of the search in justifying the considerably greater leeway 
accorded officials in stopping for document checks or inquiries 
of nationality. Tn Ortiz, then, the different nature of the stop 
woJ ld perhaps play a critical role in distinguishing Almeida. 
But in Brignoni the same stop would be allowed on the basis of 
considerably less justification than you required in Almeida 
on the basis that the absence of the search somehow makes this 
encounter much more reasonable in Fourth Amendment terms. 
Thus, the grander scheme of opinions appears to suggest 
an added difficulty in attempting to minimize the Fourth 
Amendment problems attendant to the stop in Brignoni. I have a 
hard time visualizing how the two opinions will stand togeuher 
u. 
unless we adopt a more cautious approach in Brignoni than 
simply stating that apparent alienage alone suffices to 
support a stop for inquiry into nationality. 
Apart from my visualization of the manner in which Almeida, 
Ortiz, and Brignoni relate, I see other impediments to 
resting the officiers' ability to stop on racial characteristics 
alone. To these considerations I now turn. 
IIa-Brignoni and the Stop eases Compared: 
Not only~ does a determination that racial characteristics 
alone suffice to support a stop for the limited purpose of 
inquiring into nationalit~ecome difficult to square with what 
you might have to say in Ortiz, it represents an extension of 
the cause requirement of the Terry line of cases to ~ustify 
a stop that is somewhat more intrusive than the stops considered 
by this Court previously. 
As an initial matter, it is clear that the stop . 
implicates Fourth Amendment concerns. In relative terms, 
the stop of an automobile on the highway is more of an 
infringement of liberty than the stops considered in previous 
cases in this Court. And Justice White's questions from the 
bench identified another distinction that suggests that the 
Brignoni stop raises more difficult Fourth Amendment questions 
than the Terry stops previously considered. The Government 
concedes that the rationale justifying the stop in Brignoni 
necessarily imports a greater degree of authority than the 
classic Terry stop. In Terry, Justice White expressed the opinion 
that although a policeman could always approach a citizen to make 
inquiries, the citizen was equally free to refuse t9 answer, and 
that refusal alone would not provide' probable cause for 
arrest. 392 U.S., at 34 (White, J., concurring). The Govern-
ment in this case admits, however, that the rationale for the 
Brignoni stop indicates that the officials have the power 
to hold persons who are equally uncooperative. The Brignoni 
stop thus implicates a somewhat greater theoretical power than 
the Terry stop. 
These two considerations initially would lead one to 
conclude that the justification for a stop of the kind at issue 
in Brignoni should be at least as strong as that 
required to support a Terry stop. Examination of that line 
of cases, however, suggests that a stop based solely on the 
~PLM. MQ..ittw-
fact that the automobile's occupant~would be an extension of 
the probable cause concept of the Terry l i me of cases. The 
Court in Terry itself described in some detai l the pattern of 
suspicious activity observed by the officer prior to 
his decision to approach the individuals and inquire of their 
business. In general terms, the activities observed over a 
period of some twenty minutes clearly suggested that they might 
be "casing" a store for a robbery. In Peters, the circumstances 
were equally suggestive of the fact that the individuals had 
just attempted to burgle an apartment. 392 U.S., at 48-50. And 
in Adams, cause for suspicion was provided by information of 
an informant that was partially corraborated by the observations 
of the officer on the scene. 407 U.S., at 146-147. 
A comparison of Sioron; a ' companion case to Terry, perhaps 
makes the point most clearly. In that case an officer witnessed 
Sibron talking to a number of known narcotics users over a 
period of eight hours. The officer had no precise know1Dge 
of Sibron apart from that obtained through this period of 
observation, and he did not know of the contents of the 
conversations he had observed. The officer nonetheless approaced 
Sibron in a restaurant, took him outside, and subsequently 
searched him. Although Chief Justice Warren indicated that 
the case did not require a decision whether Sibron was "seized" 
in the restraunt prior to his and the officer's departure 
(the record was unc l ear on the question whether Sibron left the 
restraunt with the officer on a voluntary basis or whether he 
was required to leave by the officer) the opinion suggests that 
the facts known to the officer were insufficient to support 
a "seizure," and I question whether they would have supported 
the kind of stop presented in Brignoni. 
"An inference that persons who talk to narcotics 
addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic 
is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required 
to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual's 
personal security. Nothing resembling probable 
cause existed until after the search •••• " 392 U.S., 
at 62-63 0 
It thus appears that the stop involved in the Brignoni 
kinds of cases is more intrusive than the stops presented in 
the Terry line of cases and that apparent alienage alone is 
a less reliable indicia of probable cause than the indicia 
previously considered. Justifying Brignoni solely on the basis of 
the racial characteristics of the occupants of the automobiles 
would therefore seem to extend Terry in both directions. 
Thus, simple consistency with prior law would indicate that 
something more than simple racial characteristi cs should be 
required to justify a warrantless stop. 
In addition to these more technical legal considerations, 
I continue to be quite troubled by the palatibility of an 
opinion that rests exclusively on the racial characteristics 
of the occupants of the automobile. First, there is the 
obvious problem of writing some things that we all know to 
be true. The clerks I have spoken to in the past few hours 
evince vastly different reactions to the problem, ranging from 
cautious acceptance that r ecognition of such a factor is 
simply an exercise in judicial candor to opinions that such 
an opinion would be a disaster . And, one' s aesthetic reactions 
aside, it seems apparent that racial characteristics are a 
significantly overinclusive criterion . As was pointed out in 
oral argument, the Mexican American component of the population 
of San Diego county is some 40-50%. I would imagine that the 
racial component of other border counties might be equally as 
high if not higher. It thus would seem unwise to indicate that 
this factor alone would justify an automobile stop in virtually 
all cases arising in 8Aproximity to the border that is similar 
to that of Brignoni. 
I think that the preferable approach is to indicate that 
the officer's ability to stop rests on a combination of factors,of 
which~ the 
Aracial characteristics of the occupants \, i s Q only one. 
Not only is this approach more consistent wi th the Terry line 
of cases, it is, r. ~I- suspect, more acceptable "politically." 
I find the preferable approach to be some variant of 
that adopted by the Ninth Circuit in its recent line of decisions • 
The articulated standard is "founded suspicion," and at 
least one decision has i nd i cated i n specific terms that a 
"founded suspicion" must be more than a suspicion based on 
racial appearance alone. In United States v. Mallides, 473 
F.2d 859 (CA ~ 1973), a pre-Almeida case, officers stopped 
an automobile containing six Mexican-appearing individuals 
in Oceanside California, a city located some seventy miles north 
of the brder. The only additional 'suspicious' indicia apart 
from the occupants' apparent nationality was that none looked at 
the marked patrol car when it passed. One officer testified that 
that aroused his suspicion; the other indicated that he made it 
a practice to stop 'all cars with Mexicans in them that appear 
to be sitting and packed in like people in [the suspect] car." 
473 F.2d., at 860. Judge Hufstedler focused on the contention 
that the racial characteristics alone might provide a "founded 
suspicion": 
Tested by objective standards there is nothing 
suspicious about six persons riding in a sedan. 
The conduct does not become suspicious simply 
because the skins of the occupants are nonwhite 
or because they sit up straight or because 
they do not look at a passing police car. 473 F.2d, 
at 861. 
Turning to the practice of stopping all automobiles containing 
Mexican-appearing persons, Judge Hufstedler indicated that 
that practice was "roundly condemned" in Davis v. Mississippi, 
394 U.S. 721, 726-727 (1969). This opinion was cited approvingly, 
and the above quoted portion was quoted by the unanimous decision 
of the Ninth Circuit sitting ~ bane in Brignoni-Ponce. 
Another decision of the Ninth Circuit, decided after this 
Court's decision in Almeida,indicates the practical operability 
of the "founded suspicion" concept. The facts in United States 
v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 leA 9 1973), cert. denied, ____ u.s. 
____ (1974) were the following. Border officials conducting a 
roving patrol of an area some 15 miles north of the border in 
a region that was known for a high incidence of smuggling activity 
noticed an automobile driven by a man of apparent Mexican lineage. 
The agents noticed that the car was riding low in the rear and 
'if) 
knew from their personal experience that that( particular make 
of automobile (some kind of stationwagon) contained a panel in 
the rear portion that smugglers often used. On these facts the 
stop was upheld. A panel of the Ninth Circuit felt that the"founded 
suspicion" standard was satisfied, distinguishing Mallides as a 
oase in which the primary focus was on race. The panel in Bugarin-
Casas indicated that consideration of race was not a fatal 
flaw in the agents thought processes, provided the other factors 
taken into consideration justified the stop. This case was also 
cited approvingly in the ~ bane decision in Brignoni o 
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While the history of the Ninth Circuit's treatment of 
this issue is by no means extensive, it does appear sufficient 
to indicate that the Ninth Circuit is developing a workable 
system of assessing probable cause for stops that avoids 
excessive reliance on alienage. The opinions of the Fifth 
Circuit articulated a concept of "reasonable suspicion" even 
prior to Almeida, see United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 
1027, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821(1974). The Tenth Circuit, however, 
has gone further. In United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993 
(CA 10 1974), a post-Almeida case, the Tenth Circuit relied on 
the statute alone to justify a stop to inquire of nationality. 
It required some additional indicia of probable cause to justify 
a search, however. Moreover, the facts of the case are somewhat 
more similar to a checkpoint situation than a roving patrol. The 
officers encountered the vehicle at a tollgate and asked the 
driver to pull over. 
In light of these considerations, and in light of the 
difficulties discussed in rely~g too heavily on racial character-
istics, I presently am inclined to adopt a"founded suspicion" 
concept similar to that developing in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits o 
Not only is this test easier to articulate, it provides a degree 
of flexibility that seems advisable to enable the courts to 
maintain a loose rein on the activities of the police and 
border patrol agents. A founded suspicion concept would, for 
example, provide ready basis for distinguishing between apparen t-
ly similar stops that occur in different locations. A stop that 
might be permissible near the border in an isolated area known 
for smuggling activities would perhaps be unwarranted in San Diego. 
Finally, that test will inevitably produce fact-specific 
applications that the Court can watch for a period of time. 
If the courts of appeal are too stringent in their application 
of the test, the Court can grant a case and provide additional 
flexibility. 
The question remains what to do with this case. The 
court of appeals in this case noted in passing that "founded 
suspicion" did not exist to support the stop. I think this 
is a close question. Perhaps the decision is justified by the need 1 
to maintain a clear 
/distinction between roving patrols and checkpoint stops. That 
distinction becomes quite blurred if roving patro~ type stops 
can be conducted at checkpoint locations on nothing more than 
the facts of this case. Still,! think this is close. 
It seems quite possible that the Government did not press 
this point with any dedication in the lower courts. The opinion 
of the court of appeals devotes more attention to 
the question of statutory justification and mentions "founded 
suspicion" only in passing. It is possible that the Government 
chose to devote their efforts more heavily to the statutory issue, 
or simply that they failed to establish an adequate record on 
the "founded suspicion" theory. Aside from this speculation 
regarding the court of appeals decision, however, the important 
fact is that the Government chose not to petition for certiorari 
on the "founded suspicion" concept . and the arguments they advance 
individualized 
in this case are not designed to meet the/standards that that 
kind of an approach would require. It therefore does not seem 
appropriate to reverse the court of appeals opinion on the basis 
of a position neither presented in the petition for certiorari 
nor specifically argued to this Court. In my v iew, the 
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affirm the court of appeals in its determination that 
a notion of "area-wide probable cause" will not support 
the stop at issue. I would make some mention of the fact 
that a question of "founded suspicion" may support stops in 
certain cases, but state that that question is not before the 
Court. This approach would both alert the lower courts to 
this concept and allow this Court to wait a period of time to 
determine how that conce~t is developing. It seems· possible 
that no need will arise to address the issue in the near future. 
The concept itself appears to contain sufficient flexibility to 
allow the courts of appeals to work out the problems. 
Questions to Consider--
It seems to me that this approach raises certain questions, 
which should be addressed prior to a decision to go one way 
or the other. First is the question whether this or any 
~proach that allows a stop for the limited purpose of 
inquiring into citizenship will largely subsume the warrant 
requirement of Almeida. In other words, will the "founded 
suspicion" to stop and inquire of citizenship always be sufficient 
t o justify a probable cause search. I have not satisfied myself 
of the answer to that question. Certainly in many cases the 
degree of probable cause will be sufficient to authorize a 
search. It seems to me that there is at least a the~retical 
difference between the two concepts, however, and I am not 
persuaded that an opinion might not identify the differences in 
amanner that would result in some practical distinction. That 
is a problem with this approach, however. 
A second problem to bear in 'mind is the question whether 
this approach would dictate a reswlt in the auto license 
check situation. Certainly it would not have an impact on 
the checkpoint type situation. And, while this would 
give some indication of direction in the discretionary stop 
context, I don't think that an opinion along these lines would 
be dispositive. The distinguishing feature, which could be 
emphasized, is that stops of this nature generally are more 
"criminal" in nature. While the illegal aliens might simply 
be deported, the smuggler will quite likely be prosecuted. 
Auto license checks, by contrast, generally are more purely 
"administrative" in nature. 
These two prob l PmS are by no means the sole problems 
with this approach. They are simply the first two that come 
to mind. I am sure that more will occur in the course of our 
subsequent conversations. 
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Ortiz and Bowen: The Warrant Requir·ement at Fixed Checkpoints--
Although it may be difficult to articulate meaningful 
standards governing the decision whether to issue a warrant, 
I think that the decision on the basic issue i smore clear-
cut.. Application of the warrant clause to fixed checkpoint 
searches seems to be a logical and necessary result of the 
positions you have taken in United States v. United States District 
Court and Almeida Sanchez . Thus, it appears that the analysis 
should begin with the assumption that the warrant clause 
applies unless the Government can demonstrate with some 
compelling force that it should not . 
The Government's argument on the basic issue of whether 
a warrant should be required is two-fold. First, the Government 
asserts that an area-wide equivalent of probable cause exists 
to support the limited kind of search that occurs at the fixed 
checkpo i nts. Secondly, the Government asserts that advance 
judicial approval through the warrant procedure would not 
materially enhance the reasonableness of the searches that 
occur. Their argument also is sprinkled with ref erences to 
the difficulty of conceptualizing and administering a warrant 
procedure. 
Addressing the first point, it would appear that the 
"area-wide probable cause" that would be thought to exist at 
any given fixed checkpoint would be less than that that would 
exist in some of the areas in which a roving patrol is conducted . 
As a simple matter of probabilities, I would imagine that the 
probability of discovering an illegal alien in a car selected 
at random is greater in the area in which the Almeida r@ving 
patrol was conducted than it is at the San Clemente checkpoint. 
The real focus of the issue thus appears to center on the 
intrusiveness of the search. But as previously mentioned, 
the search itself is generally the same in the case of a roving 
patrol and a fixed checkpoint; each search is limited to 
places in which an alien might hide. The real difference, 
assuming all searches are conducted in the manner the Government 
says they are, is In the circumstances of the encounter -- the 
"threat" factor of the unanticipated roving patrol and pullover 
as contrasted to the less frightening encounter with the officers 
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at a fixed checkpoint. Thus, the Government's argument on the 
first point appears to fail. 
The second point - that advance judicial approval will 
offer no additional protection over what can be obtained through 
subsequent motions to suppr ess. The validity of that statement 
of course will depend significantly on the content of the 
warrant. It seems that one value to be served by the warrant 
requirement is the obvious function of interposing the judiciary 
in the process of conducting a significant number of searches. 
The utlimate achievement of that endeavor will depend of course 
on what the judiciary actually does, but it seems to me that 
there is a certain virtue in the simple judicial participation. 
Not only is that consistent with general Fourth Amendment theory, 
the spectre of repeated judicial review would seem to encourage 
2. The description of the District.Court in Baca indicates 
that temporary checkpoints are character1zed by the same show of 
authority as fixed checkpoints. Thus, the rational~ for fixed points 
would appear to apply equally to temporary checkpo1nts. 
the development of regulations and procedures that are more 
standardized . Indeed, the warrant procedure might be utilized 
to demand this response. The warrant is obtained ~ parte, of 
course, and it would seem to be important to indicate the 
relationship of the preliminary warrant and the subsequent 
challenge of an individual search on a motion to suppress. 
It wouhl appear that the preliminary warrant would authorize 
a general procedure - the more standardized and more carefully 
outlined the better. Subsequent motions to suppress would then 
serve two functions. First, they would enable the magistrate to 
determine in rough terms whether the standardized procedure was 
being followe~. An individual deviation from the procedures 
authorized that is not justified by the circumstances (as, for 
instance, an unjustified decision to look into the glove compart-
ment) should warrant suppression of the evidence obtained. Repeat-
ed instances of deviation from the procedure, however, should 
prompt the magistrate to consider alteration of the procedures 
or other methods that would insure official compliance. 
It would seem important to indicate this in fairly explicit terms 
so that some magistrates would not determine that searches 
conducted pursuant to a fixed checkpoint warrant were immune 
m subsequent judicial inquiry. 
I do not anticipate that a warrant would be able to 
effectively control the discretionary decision to refer an 
automobile to the side for further inquiry or for further 
search. I simply see no way to anticipate or control that decision 
other than imposing some highly artificial limitation that would 
neither be protective nor sensible. 
Finally, the warrant procedure might serve some marginal 
value in determining the propriety of the checkpoints themselves. 
This factor is easy to overestimate. Moreover, this appears to 
be potentially the most difficult and .~ disruptive of the 
judicial decisions. The warrant requirement would appear to 
serve a negative function in this regard. Since the magistrate's 
authority does not extend beyond his own district, his power 
to determine the location of a checkpoint on ly extends to 
denying the authority to locate a Eheckpoint there. The magistrate 
would have to assess the propriety of one location in relation 
m possible alternative sites, including sites not located in 
his district. If the magistrate determined that some other loca-
tion was considerably more preferable to that chosen, he 
would have to deny permission to locate in his district on the 
ho~e that permission would be granted to locate in the alternative 
site. Given the intangible value of deterrence and the possibly 
complex interrelationship of one checkpoint to another, the 
judicial role in this regard would have to be a limited one. 
The judicial role might be more significantly exercised in 
relation to decisions to locate temporary checkpoints, however, 
where the considerations are similar but the consequences of 
a judicial determination less striking. A decision to deny 
permission to conduct a temporary checkpoint at a given location 
a~ a given time would be less disruptive of the overall border 
control effort, and it might be realiztic to expect that the 
judiciary would feel freer to exercise a more significant role 
in these decisions. 
The final alternative, that adopted by the Ninth Circuit, 
is to limit the warrant power to the power to stop and 
inquire and make subsequent searches depend on the identifica-
tion of some cause or suspicion that is engendered by the 
initial inquiry. The actual impact of that solution is 
difficult to assess. It would appear to depend on how 
closely the courts supervise the matter and, quite possibly, 
how inventive the border patrol agents are in testifying to the 
factors that led them to feel the need for further inquiry. 
I also note that this alternative is somewhat inconsistent 
with your Almeida opinion ; if probable cause can be found in 
that instance to support a search as well as a stop, it also 
should exist in this case. 
Overview of the System: 
there are so many variations involved in this case that it 
might be helpful to examine the whole system, anticipating your 
vote and the ultimate result o 
At the border and the functional equivalents--Everyone 
seems to agree that any search can be conducted at this point 
and that there is no warrant requirement and no ju~icial role. 
Roving Patrols-- The general roving patrol can be conducted 
pursuant to an Almeida warrant. Additionally, two other stops that 
~e similar to roving patrols would seem to be permissible o 
First is a decision to stop an automobile and inquire of nationality 
but not conduct a search unless additional indicia of cause arose 
during the stop o That is the Brignoni issue 9 , and it seems that the 
difficult question is identifying the nature and 
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quantum of cause that would justify such a search on the 
open highway. One alternative we have discussed is to allow 
ocops to be governed by the suspicion engendered by appearance 
alone. For the reasons outlined, I am shying away from that 
position . and toward a notion of "founded suspicion" that is 
similar to that presently used by the Ninth Circuit. The 
difficulty in this regard is determining whether there is 
a reali:Stic difference in "founded suspicion" to stop and 
inquire and "founded suspicion" to stop and search. The doctrine 
presently is offered by the Ninth Circuit for both purposes. 
I suspect in reality, however, that the "founded suspicien" 
in one case is the same as the "founded suspicion" in 
the other. In any event, the Ninth Circuit has recognized the 
possibility of "founded suspicion" stops ana searches in 
roving patrol type situations. That supplements the Almeida 
~rrant procedure. 
Fixed and Temporary Checkpoints: I would anticipate that 
a decision imposing some warrant requirement on these procedures 
fixed 
would result in some initial confusion until all of the/checkpoints 
are validated.Thereafter, I would anticipate that the decision 
to locate temporary checkpoints would be similar to that to 
conduct roving pa t rols. Under present law, the judicial 
role will be more constant than I might like, since the warrants 
must be renewed every ten days. The spectre of the "chancelor's 
foot", to quote the Chief Justice, is apparent. 
FILE MEMO 
Border Search Cases 
This file memo, dictated primarily to focus certain 
facts and issues more clearly in my mind, is rough and 
incomplete. There are helpful cert memos in each case, and 
also the bench memo prepared by David. 
The four border search cases are as follows: 
No. 73-2000 United States v. Peltier - roving patrol 
stopped and searched 70 miles from border. The search and 
conviction in DC occurred before Almeida-Sanchez. Sole 
question is retroactivity. 
No. 74-114 United States v. Brigoni-Ponce - nightime 
stop 58 miles north of the border, for purpose of questioning. 
This stop occurred pre-Almeida-Sanchez, but the SG in this 
argues only the substantive question as to the "stop". 
No. 73-6848 Bowen v. United States - . P~9P and search 
t11A-~~ &'' (p , 
at fixed checkpoint 49 miles north of border~ This is the 
"key" CA9 decision, holding 7 to 6 that Almeida-Sanchez is 
applicable to fixed-checkpoint searches. But by 7 to 6 
vote, Almeida was held to create a new constitutional rule 
as to fixed checkpoints, and therefore not retroactive to 
searches prior to June 21, 1973. 
No. 73-2050 United States v. Ortiz - a post A/S stop 
and search at a fixed checkpoint (3 aliens were found), 
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66 miles north of the border. This is the "cornerstone" 
checkpoint operating continuously. This case also presents 
a potential issue of retroactivity: whether the decision 
should apply to invalidate searches conducted prior to the 
9th Circuit's en bane decision in Bowen. 
Facts Common to All Cases 
Section 287(a) [i.~o, 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)] is relied upon 
by the government in all cases. This was the statute before 
us in A/S, authorizing immigration service officers without 
a warrant: 
"(1) to interrogate any alien· or person 
believed to be an alien as to his rignt to be 
or to remain in the United States; 
(3) within a reasonable distance from any 
external border of the United States, to board 
and search for aliens any • • • vehicle, . • • " 
An Immigration Service regulation defines "reasonable 
distance" to mean within 100 miles from any external boundary. 
There was no warrant and no "probable cause", in a 
Fourth Amendment sense, in any case. Nor does the government 
contend that any of these stops or searches was the 
"functional equivalent" of a border search. 
3. 
Significant Facts and Issues 
Peltier 
The question presented is whether A/S is to be applied 
retroactively. 
Respondent's vehicle was stopped and searched by a roving 
patrol, 70 miles north of the border, several months prior to 
to our decision in A/S. 270 pounds of marijuana were found. 
The District Court, acting prior to A/S, denied a motion to 
suppress. Respondent was found guilty and sentenced prior 
to A/S, but CA9 - 7 to 6 en bane - reversed the judgment, 
holding that A/S must be applied retroactively to cases 
pending on appeal. 
The rationale of CA9 1 s opinion would apply A/S retroactively 
certainly to all cases not finally litigated.* Judge Goodwin's 
opinion stated that A/S neither overruled past precedent of 
the Supreme Court nor disrupted long-accepted practice. The 
SG argues, however, that A/S "was a departure from existing 
law". The SG states that this was recognized in Justice 
White's opinion in A/S, as well as in my opinion.** 
*It is not clear to me that the rationale would not also apply 
even to habeas corpus proceedings with respect to cases decided 
years before. 
**Justice White, at 413 UaS. 298, said that "the clear rule 
of the Circuit (CA9) is that conveyances may be stopped and 
examined for aliens without warrant or probable cause •.. a" 
In footnote 10, Justice White stated that in the "20 courts 
of appeals cases I have noted, • • • 35 different judges 
of three courts of appeals found inspection of vehicles for 
illegal aliens, without warrant or probable cause, to be 
constitutional. 
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The SG also argues that A/S was a new application ax 
of the evidentiary exclusionary rule, and overruled past 
precedent in the Courts of Appeals as well as long-established 
administrative practice of the immigration authorities. 
Finally, the SG argues, persuasively, I think, that 
a retroactive application of A/S would not further the purposes 
of the exclusionary rule: that is, it would not deter future 
violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
Ortiz 
This is a major fixed checkpoint case, involving a 
stop and search at the San Clemente checkpoint - the 
cornerstone of the Immigration Service network. Respondent 
is a smuggler. He was stopped and three aliens were found 
concealed in the trunk of his car. No question of retroactivity 
is involved. In view of the confusion resulting from A/S, 
some 20 cases pending in the Southern District of California 
were consolidated in the fall of 1973 for a comprehensive 
factual hearing, presided over by Judge Turrentine. After 
"extensive evidence" was submitted, the district judge filed 
a comprehensive opinion in which the relevant facts relating 
to the magnitude of the problem are summarized - rather 
dramatically. See the SG's petition for certiorari in 
73-2050 (Ortiz). The DC found these fixed checkpoints to 
be the functional equivalent of a border search. 
5. 
But CA9, 6 to 7, in U.S. v. Bowen, held to the contrary, 
and applied the rationale of A/S to fixed checkpoints. 
Accordingly, CA9 - relying on Bowen - reversed the District 
Court in this case. 
The arguments pro and con are well set forth in the 
opinions of Judge Goodwin (for seven judges) and Judge 
Wallace (for eight judges) in Bowen, No o 73=·6848. These 
opinions should be reread prior to Conference. 
On appeal, the SG substantially abandons the argument 
that these fixed checkpoints - remote from the border - are 
the functional equivalent of a border search. Rather, the 
SG's principal argument is that -based on the facts applicable 
to this particular area of California - there is "an area-wide 
equivalent of probable cause for the limited-vehicle searches 
conducted at fixed checkpoints." The special conditions in 
this area, allegedly giving rise to the "equivalent of 
probable cause" include the following: 
(i) high concentration of aliens illegally 
in the U.S. 
(ii) policing national boundaries with Mexico 
present "peculiar and difficult law enforcement 
problems". 
(iii) traffic checkpoints are essential to 
effective enforcement of immigration laws. 
(iv) the checkpoint operations are conducted 
primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorial 
purposes, as virtually no aliens are prosecuted 
(only the smugglers). 
(iv) the checkpoint searches involve only a 
modest intrusion upon privacy. 
6. 
(vi) checkpoint searches have consistently 
been approved by courts of appeals and employed for 
many years. 
An interesting question (especially in view of my 
concurrence in A/S) is the feasibility of an area warrant 
procedure addressed to specific checkpoints. Respondents' 
brief(pp. 66-69) argues that such procedure is feasible, and 
emphasizes that such warrants "are currently issued in various 
federal districts throughout southwestern United States." 
The SG's brief (po 38 et seg.) argues that a warrant 
procedure for checkpoints would be unworkable primarily 
because of (i) the necessity or coordination between the 
17 permanent and 30 temporary checkpoints in California, 
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, within six different federal 
judicial districts, and (ii) the tendency of district judges -
based on experience to date - to limit the warrants merely 
to stopping (in many instances) and to limit the periods to 
10 days. 
7. 
Comment: Although there is obvious force to the govern-
ment's reluctance to endorse a general area-type warrant or 
specific checkpoints, I am not yet persuaded that this 
procedure is not feasible - especially if we laid down some 
fairly broad guidelines. In this connection, I wonder if 
anything is to be gained from an analogy to authorization 
in the wiretap caseso To be sure, this is pursuant to 
congressional legislation. 
Bowen 
Like Ortiz, this is a fixed checkpoint case. Indeed, 
CA9's opinion in this case is the controlling 9th Circuit 
authority applying (by 7 to 6 vote) A/S to fixed checkpoints 
on the same rationale as the Court adopted with respect to 
roving patrols. 
But this case has a retroactivity question not present 
in Ortiz~ CA9 held, again 7 to 9 (but with a different 
lineup) that, in view of long-established precedent in the 
9th Circuit to the contrary, the court's decision in Bowen 
should not be applied retroactively. 
It will be recalled that in Peltier, decided May 9, 
1974, CA9 applied A/S retroactively to a roving patrol 
case, but in Bowen CA9 distinguished - for purposes of 
retroactivity - between roving patrols and fixed checkpoints. 
8. 
With respect to the latter, CA9 concluded that long-established 
authority in the Circuit, as well as administrative conduct, 
had established fixed checkpoints as the principal means of 
controlling immigration. 
Comment: The single most important issue, as I view 
it, to be decided in these four cases is the validity of 
searches at fixed checkpointso The most exhaustive appellate 
court consideration of that issue is in Bowen, whereas the 
district court decision that is most helpful on the facts is 
in Ortiz. I suppose we could decide the substantive Fourth 
Amendment issue in Ortiz ' which is squarely presented there. 
We could then confine our decision of Bowen to the retroactivity 
issue. 
Humberto Brignoni-Ponce 
This case, significandy different from the foregoing, 
involves only a "stop" with no search. 
Immigration officers were stationed at a fixed checkpoint 
65 miles north of the border, but which happened to be closed 
due to bad weather. The officers observed passing cars, and 
followed respondent's car because its occupants appeared to 
be Mexicans. The three occupants spoke no English and had 
no identification papers. When questioned in Spanish, it 
appeared that two of them - the passengers - were Mexican 
9. 
citizens ±iig illegally in the United States. Respondent 
was prosecuted and convicted for transporting aliens, but 
the Court of Appeals - again sitting en bane and again by 
a 7 to 6 vote - reversed the conviction. 
CA9 fotm.d no distinction between a"stop" and a "search" 
in the application of the rationale of A/S. It recognized 
that A/S involved only a search, but pointed to language 
(dictum) that appeared to apply the same principles to a stop. 
It was conceded that there was no probable cause, and 
CA9 concluded there was not even "a fotm.ded suspicion". 
The government, essentially, makes two arguments: 
(i) That there exists in fact an area-wide equivalent 
of probable RXXHH cause that justifies a brief stop of a 
vehicle in the Mexican-border area; and 
(ii) Advance judicial approval is not necessary to 
insure the reasonableness of a brief investigative stop of 
a vehicle in this area. 
The latter point, which is of considerable interest to 
me, is buttressed to some extent at least by the Court's 
decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18. The SG's 
brief (p. 25) states that the Immigration Service "informs 
us that a stop for questioning at a checkpoint ordinarily 
takes no more than about 5 seconds per occupant and that 
even a roving-patrol stop for questioning usually consumes 
no more than a minute. Such stops involve no search rmless 
the officers have a particularized probable cause. 
10. 
The SG also points out that courts have upheld routine 
warrantless stops of vehicles for license and registration 
checks. See SG's brief p. 28 and cases cited in note 19. 
Comment: This type of stop is easier to reconcile with 
the Fourth Amendment and our cases than a search, especially 
if the stop occurs at a fixed checkpoint. The situation is 
somewhat less clear, and the government's position weaker, 
where the stop appears to be altogether random by a roving 
patrol. Having in mind the customary checking of licenses 
that goes on in Virginia at regular intervals, when officers 
at checkpoints stop most cars and check driver's licenses, 
the procedure here involved. differs only in that the stops 
are confined to automobiles occupied by persons who appear 
to be Mexicans. There may be an Equal Protection Clause 
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Border Search Cases 
are prepared to assist me in the Conference 
~·-<-- ?-d.~(~ p~ /J.u • .tJ 
I. Retroactivity  ~ ( f<--tcJ CJL.Lt,_~ 
I would not apply Almeida-Sanchez (A/S) retroactively. 
Thus, I will vote to reverse Peltier, and to affirm Bowen on 
this issue. 
· In Lemon v. Kurtzman we indicated that in determining 
retroactivity, we should focus on the practical "facts of 
lega~ life". In view of (i) the decisions in CA9 and CAlO, 
(ii) the federal statute, at least arguably authorizing this 
conduct, and (iii) the prophylactic purpose of the exclusionary 
rule, I view A/S as prospective in its precedential effect. 
~(~/ ~ct. y 
Fixed Checkpoint Searches I . , -~ · 
- c;{-t) .4A) ~ Pf~~ 
~ ";...uf ~/$ ' /,/-
Bowen and Ortiz present the central issue, as I view it, 
II. 
in the border search cases. In Bowen, CA9 en bane (7 to 6) 
invalidated fixed checkpoint searches on the basis of A/S. 
There was also a retroactivity issue in Bowen, CA9 holding 
7 to 6 that as to fixed checkpoints A/S is not retroactive. 
Ortiz involves solely the validity of the fixed checkpoint 
search. I would be inclined to write a single opinion 
covering both of these cases. I would affirm, but in an 
opinion which applies the rationale of my concurrence in 
A/S to fixed checkpoint searches. 
L.. 
The Choices: Broadly speaking, we have three choices 
as to this issue: (i) accept the government's theory that 
there is an "area-wide equivalent of probable cause", which 
is sufficient without a warrant or even without a particularized 
"founded suspicion"; (ii) accept respondents' position, adopted 
by a bare majority of CA9 (but not approved by CAlO), that 
A/S applies as well to fixed checkpoints, requiring"strict 
compliance with classic Fourth Amendment standards; or (iii) 
as I suggested in my concurrence in A/S, approve a warrant 
procedure for checkpoint searches. 
None of these alternatives is free from substantial 
objections. The government's position (even though supported 
at least arguably by the statute) is without support in our 
precedents. Respondents' position, adopted by 7 of the 13 
CA9 judges, would be the easiest to write, as it fits more . 
neatly into conventional Fourth Amendment analysis. But I 
do not think the Fourth Amendment precedents, none of which 
address~ this particular problem, command literalistic 
adherence in the circumstances of these difficult cases. 
Moreover, while our duty is to decide cases in accord with 
the Constitution, the Supreme Court cannot be unaware of 
the consequences of its decisions. The need .is apparent for 
adjudiation that accords with principle and yet takes into 
-'· 
account the special facts and manifest public interest which 
weigh against stripping the government of the deterrence (as 
well asthe more tangible results) of the checkpoints. Indeed, 
Judge Turrentine - who heard several days of testimony - found 
that there is no other effective way to limit the alien influx. 
A Warrant Procedure. These considerations bring me to 
the conclusion that a warrant procedure , despite some of the 
attendant problems, is the best available answer~ In A/S, 
I suggested some of the considerations that would j.ustif¥ 
a finding of "area probable cause", including the following: 
(i) The frequency with which alienis illegally 
in the country are known or reasonably Helieved to 
be tran~ported in a particular area; 
(ii) The proximity of the area in question to 
the border; 
(iii) The extensiveness and geographic 
characteristics of the area, including the roads 
therein and the extent of their use; and 
(iv) The probable degree of interference with 
the rights of innocent persons, . taking into account 
the scope of the proposed search, its duration, and 
the concentration of illegal-alien traffic in relation 
to the general traffic of the road or area. 
It is evident that not all of the foregoing considerations 
are equally applicable to a warrant procedure for a fixed 
checkpoint. I doubt, for example, that a warrant to conduct 
~~a roving patrol in the San Clemente vicinity would meet the 
standards I suggested. 
But there is a vital distinction between the roving 
patrol and the fixed checkpoint. In my view, a considerably 
---·~·-· ~ 
l 
' I '"'t'o 
less demanding standard would be necessary to support a warrant 
to operate a fixed checkpoint than to conduct a roving patrol. 
The distinguishing characteristic between the two lies 
in the circumstances that surround the initial stop and 
confrontation. In each case, the scope of the resulting search 
is essentially the same. But the circumstances attendant upon 
the stop (rather than the search) are significantly different: 
in the case of a r oving patrol, the stop is usually . totally 
unexpected, is announced only by a flashing light and 
accompanied~en, and ~ay occur in the middle of the night 
. . " on a lonely road. At the fixed checkpoint, by contrast, the 
stop is preceded by visible and reliable signs of authority; 
the location is announced by signs and lights, the stopping 
officer is uniformed and plainly visible from the outset, and 
the overall atmosphere is such as to assure the party in 
question that the encounter is official and legitimate. There 
can be little question, also, that the · sense of personal 
intrusion upon privacy is appreciably less where a check 
obviously is being made of a substantial number of travelers, 
in an orderly and relatively public manner. In such surroundings, 
there is little opportunity for police intimidation or "rough" 
tactics. In many respects, the intrusion is no greater than 
that when a motorist is stopped at a checkpoint and requested 
to display his driver's license. 
Assuming, then, that we agreed that a warrant procedure 
is feasible, what considerations would justify a district 
Jo 
judge or a magistrate in finding probable cause to authorize 
fixed-checkpoint searches? 
Location of the Checkpoint. All of the considerations 
I mentioned in A/S would be relevant in varying degrees but 
none would be controlling. Proximity to the border; the 
geographic characteristics of the area; the network of , 
~~-rs -~ 
highways in the area; the pattern of use of such -pa~ 
rendezvous between smugglers and Mexicans who make random 
crossings of the border, their customary transportation . ,. 
' 
routes northward, all would be relevant. The extent of 
illegal alien traffic, and the degree of interference with 
the rights of innocent persons also could be important in 
determining whether a particular location should be authorized. 
~ · .·. ·~ 
D • • s Th.. . h~h . LscretLon to top. 1\ ere LS t e urt er questLon as to 
discretion by the officer as to whom to stop. I would 
hesitate a long time to say that racial characteristics alone 
justify stopping and searching an automobile, certainly not 
in an area like San Diego county which is 40/50% Mexican-
American. Rather, an officer's authority to stop should 
depend on the combination of factors, of which the racial 
characteristics of the occupants is "only one. 
Here, we can gain some insight from the 9th Circuit~ 
standard of "founded suspicion". The facts in United States 
v. Bugarin-Kasas, 484 F.2d 853 (1973), cert. den. ____ U.S. 
____ (1974) affords some guidance: There, border officials, 
"1' ' 
- --~-~~~~ ~-A-" 6'L I~\'-~ 
f -- =~1J:::L ci{'J~{ 
conducting a roving p-it~ some- is miles north of the border 
in a region known for a high incidence of smuggling activity, 
observed an automobile driven by an apparent Mexican; the 
car was riding low .in the rear; and it was a type of station-
wagon easily (and frequently) converted for use by smugglers 
in transporting aliens. A panel of CA9 concluded that the 
"founded suspicion" ' standard was satisfied. It also held 
that consideration of race was not a fatal flaw, where other 
factors also are taken into consideration with race (proximity 
to border, aspecm of the car indicating heavy rear loading, 
type of car and other suspicious circumstances) combine 
to justify the stop.* 
My pre sent inclination would be to hold that, pu~suant 
to a proper check-point warrant, officials at a fixed check-
point could inquire of anyone's citizenship, and could detain ~ 
those individuals for the time required to do so. If, 
·~~,t,.A ,,, however, the officials wish to conduct a search, I would 




Nature of the Search. The warrant procedure that I 
contemplate would specify the nature of 'the search that 
could be conducted in an appropriate case. I would anticipate 
that the search would be limited to a visual inspection of 
' 
the areas in which aliens may reasonably be thought to be 
*The 5th Circuit also has articulated a conc~pt of "reasonable 
suspicion" even prior to A/S. See United States v. Wright, 
476 F.2d 1027; and the lOth Circuit has gone even further 
in United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993 (1974). 
7. 
secreted. Searches that exceeded this scope without adequate 
justification would be invalid. Thus, notwithstanding the 
existence of the general warrant, an individual whose auto-
mobile was searched would remain free to raise that issue 
in a subsequent suppression hearing. 
In short, I am inclined to sustain a checkpoint stop 
and search where (i) a warrant procedure has been followed 
to establish probable cause for the location and use of the 
checkpoint, (ii) where discretion to stop and search must be 
supported by facts which constitute a "founded suspicion", 
of which race may be one (but would not be sufficient standing 
entirely alone), ana (iii) where the search is limited to 
visual inspection of areas where aliens may be secreted. · 
Return· on the Warrant. Under Rule 41, as presently 
in effect, such a warrant can only be effective for 10 days. 
If we write along these lines, our opinion should suggest the 
need for revision of Rule 41. Pending revision, renewals 
of the warrant can be obtained even though this procedure 
isrsomewhat inconvenient to the . magistrate and counsel. A 
"return" reporting on the results of the surveillance, is 
required, whether the warrant covers a period of 10 days or 
longer. 
This requirement should serve as a safeguard against 
abuse. I assume the return would show, as a minimum, the 
period of time during which the checkpoint was operated, the 
8. 
number of vehicles that passed, the number stopped for 
questioning, the number actually .searched, and the results. 
Although the analogy is not entirely complete, the 
type of procedure outlined above is generally consistent in 
theory with our wiretap cases, especially Katz and U.S. 
District Court. I also think we draw doctrinal support from 
the rationale of Terry · and its progeny. 
I do not suggest that the Government will be happy with 
the foregoing resolution. There will be a good many practical 
difficulties, especially those arising from the ten-day 
limitation and from the importance of coordination between 
various geographic areas, coordination as to standards, 
consistency of the application thereof, location of the 
checkpoints, timing of the operation and the like. But until 
the Congress enacts new legislation prescribing standards 
and methods of coordination, we will simply have to reply 
on the common sense of the federal courts in the states in 
question. 
III.· The Stop for Questioning (Brignoni-Ponce) 
The SG argues only the substantive question as to the 
yalidity of the stop. I view this as a "roving patrol" stop. 
The fixed checkpoint was closed at the time and the officers 
"gave chase". The arrest resulted when it appeared that the 
passengers were alien Mexicans. There was no search. 
9. 
CA9 found no distinction between a ''stop" and "a search" 
under the rationale of A/S. While A/S did not decide the 
"stop" issue, for reasons indicated below I am inclined to 
agree that there is no significant difference in legal and 
practical consequences. 
If a stop is to be meaningful, in the sense that the 
party stopped is forced to remain for · questioning (even for 
a few seconds, as the SG argues) , there is a "sei'zure" rmder 
the Fourth Amendment. And that Amendment draws no distinction 
between searches and seizures. There is, however, the Terry 
gloss on strict Fourth Amendment analysis. In reviewing the 
Terry line of cases (Terry, Peters, Sibron and Adams), one 
must conclude - I think - that there was in each of these a 
more particularized reason for suspicion than that present 
in Brignoni, where apparently the only articulated reason 
for the stop was the Mexican appearance of the occupants of 
the car. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was 
no "founded suspicion" supporting this stop, and that issue 
is not before us. 
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Border Search Cases 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE : 
I thought it might be helpful if I shared with you this 
memorandum on the latest decision relating to the border 
search cases we considered in February. In United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, et al, Nos. 74-2462, 74-2568, 74-2714 (March 
5, 1975), a panel (2 to 1) of the Ninth Circuit invalidated 
the "warrant of inspection" issued by the District Court to 
authorize the operation of the fixed checkpoint at San Clemente. 
The warrant there considered authorized agents "to stop 
northbound motor vehicles for the purpose of making routine 
inquiries to determine the nationality and/or immigration 
status of the occupants," and also "to conduct a routine 
inspection of said vehicles for the presence of aliens." 
The latter authorization appears to have been interpreted by 
the Government to empower agents to search trunks and other 
places where persons might hide. But the validity of that 
authorization was not an issue in these appeals,* and the 
court noted that subsequent warrants limited the agents to lA 
a stop and inquiry procedure. f\ 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion indicates that the warrant 
was issued for ten-day periods and had been renewed 26 times. 
*In each of the three cases considered by the Ninth 
Circuit the stop and inquiry, without search, revealed that 
the automobile contained illega aliens. n United States 
v. Guillen, No. 74-2714, a subsequent search of the trunk 
revealed additional illegal aliens. The court assumed in 
that case that the initial discovery provided probable cause 
to inspect the trunk, and therefore did not consider that 
search to have been conducted pursuant to the warrant's 
"inspection" authorization. 
- 2 -
The District Court required the compilation of statistics 
relating to the operation of the checkpoint, and the Ninth 
Circuit opinion summarizes this data. These indicate that 
an average of 1,200 vehicles pass through the San Clemente 
checkpoint per hour and that at peak times the figure 
increases to 2,500. By the Ninth Circuit's calculation, 
this suggests that over 10-1/2 million automobiles pass 
through that checkpoint annually. 
The more interesting figures are those compiled during 
an eight-day period in June of 1974. Over that period 
approximately 145,960 vehicles passed through the checkpoint 
during periods in which it was operating. Presumably all of 
that number were required to slow down to allow the officer 
at the "point" to scan the vehicle and its occupants and 
determine whether further inquiry was warranted. But only 
820 of the almost 146,000 vehicles were "stopped" and referred 
to a secondary area for questioning regarding citizenship and 
immigration status. And of the 820 "stopped", 202 were 
"inspected". 
The Ninth Circuit suggested that it was unable to ascertain 
exactly what an "inspection" was. But it apparently is some-
thing less than a search. The court noted that deportable 
aliens were discovered in "plain view" in 169 of the 202 
vehicles so "inspected". The court further indicated that 
agents searched portions of the vehicles in which aliens 
might hide in 33 instances, each allegedly with the consent 
of the driver, and discovered illegal aliens in two of the 
automobiles so searched.* In total, agents discovered 725 II 
~eportab~e aliens in 171 vehicles during the eight-day period 
~n quest~on. 
*I would suppose that in virtually all of the 169 instances 
in which the initial questioning revealed illegal aliens in 
"plain view" the agents conducted a further search of the 
automobile. See note 1, supra. In those cases the subsequent 
search would appear to be supported by concrete probable cause 
and justifiable under more traditional Fourth Amendment 
principles. I assume, therefore, that the 33 instances 
identified as searches are cases in which the initial inquiry 
does not itself reveal the presence of illegal aliens but does 
suggest the need to inquire further. Whether "probable cause" 
or "founded suspicion" existed in these cases would be a 
matter to be determined on the facts of the particular case. 
~J 
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Relying primarily on these statistics, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the "inspection warrant" system was invalid. 
Judge Duniway noted that of the nearly 146,000 automobiles 
passing through the San Clemente checkpoint only 171, or 
0.12%,were found to contain illegal aliens. He considered 
this to be too low an incidence to justify what he viewed as 
an "intolerable" degree of interference imposed on the 
motorists passing through the checkpoint: 
"Roughly 999 of every 1,000 cars passing through 
the checkpoint carry only persons who are lawfully 
within the country and under Carroll are entitled 
'to use the public highways [and] have a right 
to free passage without interruption.' Although 
the duration of a stop and even a detention for 
immigration questioning may be brief, the con-
centration of illegal alien traffic is too small. 
We cannot countenance the cumulative intrusion of 
stopping ten million cars per year where only one 
out of 1,000 passing cars may contain aliens 
illegally within the country." 
Judge Duniway devoted a major part of his opinion to 
my concurrence in Almeida, viewing it, I must say, with little 
enthusiasm. In addition to finding that the checkpoint 
authorization would not meet the general standards outlined 
in my Almeida concurrence, Judge Duniway's opinion held 
flatly: 
Judge Carter, dissenting, viewed the case quite 
differently, and I am inclined to agree with the essence 
of his opinion. The undisputed facts clearly indicate that 
(i) the checkpoint was used with restraint and discrimination; 
(ii) only a minute fraction of the motoring population was 
inconvenienced in any way except by being required to slow 
down - hardly an "intolerable inconvenience" to motorists 
who are accustomed - as we all are - to stop and yield signs 
and occasionally being stopped for license checks; and (iii) 
of the vehicles stopped for brief questioning as to 
nationality and immigration status, one out of every five 
(20%) was found to be transporting aliens - an extraordinarily 
high percentage of successes . 
• 
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It is to be remembered that this op~n~on invalidates a 
simple stop and inquiry procedure. What I said in Almeida 
applied to full searches by roving patrols. Indeed, as I 
indicated at our Conference, I would not be inclined to 
extend my Almeida standards to authorize searches at a 
checkpoint 66 miles from the border and on a highway with 
this level of traffic. I would require some more particularized 
"cause" to justify an actual search of the private portions 
of automobiles stopped at a fixed checkpoint. But there is ~~•r4 
a controlling difference, in my view, between a checkpoint ~,4.~~ 
warrant authorizing searches and one limited to routine 
questions which any motorist should be willing to answer. 
There simply is no comparison between the degree of 
"intrusiveness" of a search and a stop only to inquire as 
nationality and immigration status. 
a ••• t. 
to L _ _., 
~~ 
~ 
Judge Duniway, by relating the number of vehicles ~ 
in which aliens were found during the period in question ~LL-~. __ ~~c-_--:: _A 
to the total number of vehicles passing the checkpoint, 
concludes that the results do not justify the "intolerable"d•c-4 
inconvenience imposed upon motorists. I do not consider ~~-- ~­
discovery of 725 deportable aliens during the course of ~~ 
a part-time operation of the checkpoint over eight days to 
be an inconsequential result. Th!s OEeration apprehended 
nearly 100 aliens per day. Moreover, tliese £igures ao not 
taKe Into acconfit the number of smugglers and aliens 
"deterred" from attempting to go northward, a factor 
emphasized by Judge Turrentine in his district court opinion 
in United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973).* 
The situation in the Ninth Circuit is further confounded 
by the decision of another panel in United States v. Evans, 
*Judge Turrentine's opinion in Baca, which is printed in 
the petition for cert. in No. 73-205n:-contains the most 
exhaustive statement of the facts with respect to this problem. 
Its findings differ from the opinion of Judge Duniway in 
significant respects. The latter thought that "the influx 
of illegal aliens could conceivably be stemmed in various 
ways" other than by use of checkpoints. Judge Turrentine, 
on the other hand, concluded that "the evidence presented 
. . . clearly establishes that there is no reasonable or 
effective alternative method of detection and apprehension 
available to the border patrol •... " See Pet. for Cert. 
in No. 73-2050
2 
at 20a. That opinion also provides an 
additional ind~cation of the importance of the San Clemente 
checkpoint, revealing that in fiscal year 1973 over 12,000 
deportable aliens were apprehended there. Id., at 25a. 
- 5 -
507 F.2d 879, 880 (CA9 1974). In Evans, no constitutional 
defect was found where motor traff~c was simply diverted into 
a zone where it could be observed by officers. In that case, 
an automobile had been "waived through" a fixed checkpoint 
without being required to pull over. As the automobile 
passed, however, an officer noticed aliens lying in the 
space between the front and back seats and the car was then 
stopped. The appellant argued that the "slow down", which 
allowed the officer to look into the automobile,was itself 
a violation of Fourth Amendment rights since it was conducted 
without a warrant or probable cause. The Ninth Circuit panelr--
rejected that contention, holding that there is no constitu-
tional objection to a warrantless "diversion of motor traffic 
into a zone where it can be observed by officers." Id., at 
880. --
In view of these two recent cases, following those 
pending before this Court, the law of the Ninth Circuit is 
in a state of shambles. Martinez-Fuerte, which was decided 
after Evans, mentions the latter only in a footnote and 
purports to distinguish that case on the ground that it did 
not involve a stop. When one attem~s to rationalize the two, 
the result seems to be as follows: Under Evans, government 
agents may erect a checkpoint anrohere and, without a warrant 
of any kind, compel traffic to s ow down sufficiencly to 
allow an effective visual inspection of vehicles and their 
occupants. If that inspection arouses "founded suspicion" 
the vehicle can be stopped for inquiry, and if probable cause 
exists it can then be searched. Yet Martinez-Fuerte applies 
the Fourth Amendment with full vigor even to a "fleeting stop," 
and invalidates a warrant authorizing operation of a fixed 
checkpoint at an appropriate place and resulting stops for 
the limited purpose of inquiring into nationality and 
immigration status. In short, a slow down anywhere for 
visual inspection is valid, whereas a fleeting stop for 
questions is invalid even when authorized by a checkpoint 
warrant. The purposes of both procedures are identical and 
the degree of intrusion is likely to be indistinguishable. 
If immigration officers in CA9 find little rationality 
in these distinctions, they are not alone. 
- 6 -
In view of the foregoing, and the present incon-
clusiveness of our tentative votes at the Conference on the 
cases that have been argued, it occurs to me that perhaps we 
should relist these cases for a further Conference discus-
sion. If a Court cannot be assembled, the cases presumably 
should be set for reargument early next fall and some thought 
should be given as to what stays, if any, should be entered 
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Border Search Cases 
In a conversation today with Chief Judge John Brown 
of the Fifth Circuit, he again expressed the hope that 
we will be able to decide the Border Search Cases this 
Term. 
Judge Brown stated that the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals is holding some 15 to 20 cases, awaiting our 
decision. He emphasized, however, that the more serious 
problem is the backup of cases in the United States 
prosecutors' offices in the Southern and 'vestern Districts 
of Texas. It is estimated that some 200 prosecutions are 
being postponed pending our decision. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 








MEMORANDUM TO THE 
In view of the circulation of a memorandum on these 
cases by Bill Douglas, I thought perhaps I should say that 
I am working on a memorandum as requested by the Chief 
Justice. , As I plan to attend the Fifth Circuit Conference 
the early part of next week, it will be another ~endays 
before I can circulate my memorandum. · .·· 4: 
'. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.jlt}tttmt Qfttu.rt ttf tqt ~b .jtaftg 
'Jlagqmghttt. ~. <!f. 2lT.;l'!.;l 
..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL May 28, 1975 
Re: No. 73-2050-- U.S. v. Ortiz 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree with your memorandum in this case 
and would join it as an opinion of the Court. 
Sincerely, 
flt-
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.i'ttpTmtt <!fltltrl 4lf tlrt ~b ,jhdtg 
'JJMJrittgftm.lO. Qf. 20bi~' 
May 28, 1975 
No. 73-2050, U. S. v. Ortiz 
Dear Lewis, 
I agree with your memorandum in 
this case and would join it as an opinion of 
the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
Dear Lewis: 
~u:pnm.c QJomt of ur~ ~ttiltb ~fa:ltg 
'J)ttra:s-Irittgfott, If~. <!f. 20~~.;l 
June 4, 1975 
RE: UNITED STATES V. ORTIZ, 73-2050 
UNITED STATES V. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 74-114 
BOWEN V. UNITED STATES, 73-6848 
/ 
If your memoranda in these cases become opinions for the 
Court, I vote as follows: 
In UNITED STATES V. ORTIZ, 73-2050, please join me. 
In UNITED STATES V. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 74-114, I shall file 
a separate statement concurring in the result. 
In BOWEN V. UNITED STATES, 73-6848, I shall dissent for 
reasons stated in my dissent in UNITED STATES V. PELTIER, 73-2000. 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
C H AMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
PERSONAL 
Dear Chief: 
~ltftUlltt Qfourl ttf f4~ ~triftb ~taftg 
~asfrin.ghm, ~. QJ'. 2ll.?'-~~ 
June 6, 1975 
Border Search Cases 
Although I am grateful for the vote in Bowen, I am 
quite disappointed that you think we have not "found the 
key" to the proper resolution of Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz. 
I write primarily to suRgest that we are unlikely to 
find five votes for any "key more to your liking. This 
is a judgment (with which you may disagree entirely) based 
on my having devoted more time to the study of these cases 
than to any other assignment you have given me this year. 
The drafts which I have circulated are in accord on 
principle with Fourth Amendment precedents, the most recent 
of which is Almeida-Sanchez. In one respect, however, it 
can be said that I have departed somewhat from precedent. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, I proposed a "reasonable suspicion" 
standard for random stopping and questioning of occupants 
of vehicles by roving patrols. This affords more leeway 
to law enforcement officers than any prior Fourth Amendment 
case with which I am familiar, although I drew heavily on 
Terry and Adams.* 
I do not believe that the "reasonable suspicion" 
standard will unduly handicap officers on roving patrol. 
*In those cases, as you will recall, the investigating 
officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
suspects were armed and that they might be dangerous. 
This is a considerably higher requirement than the "rea-
sonable suspicion" which I propose in Brignoni-Ponce. 
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I invite your attention particularly to Part IV of my 
Brignoni-Ponce opinion (p. 10-12) for the "factors [that] 
may be taken into account in deciding whether there is a 
reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area". 
With this portion of my opinion in mind, I further invite 
you to read Bill Douglas' concurrence, circulated June 5, in 
which he attacks the "reasonable suspicion" proposal. 
It is thus evident that, so long as the composition of 
the Court remains as it is now, the resolution I propose is 
likely to be the closest to your tentative views. Putting 
it differently, we have the same 5 to 4 split that decided 
Almeida-Sanchez, except that Bill Douglas would require an 
even higher standard than I propose. Absent a change in 
the personnel of the Court, it is unrealistic to think that 
the result will be different at any future Term - unless 
Justices Brennan or Marshall retreat from my position to 
that of Bill Douglas. 
It is also entirely speculative whether a change in 
Court composition will create a new majority.* We hope there 
will be no change for many years; we have no idea which Justice 
will be the first to leave; and we certainly have no idea as 
to the views of the Justice who might fill a vacancy. 
Of course, we do not have to agree on a Court opinion. 
But examples that come to mind (e.g., Metromedia) have hardly 
been satisfactory to the bench or oar. The Border Search 
Cases present an especially pressing problem, with courts 
and U.S. Attorneys in four states awaiting definitive 
guidance. I am sure we all would regret further delay or 
a fractured Court. 
As you know, we also have pending here cases which 
present the validity of random stops for questioning at 
established checkpoints. These are perhaps the most im~ortant 
of all of these cases. I confirm what I said at Friday s 
Conference, namely, that I have carefully considered the 
*I do not imply that the possibility of a future change 
affects any of our judgments. I am merely exploring whether 
it is realistic to think the present situation will change. 
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issue, and will vote to affirm the right of the border patrol 
officers to make such stops - without requiring reasonable 
suspicion - at the established checkpoint. Potter expressed 
the same view at Conference, and has confirmed it to me per-
sonally. I think there is a vast difference between the 
circumstances of the regularized stops at established check-
points (which are quite analogous to stopping vehicles for 
license checks), and the random stops by roving patrols at 
any time of day or night on any road or highway within a 
hundred miles of the border. 
You may recall Bill Rehnquist's statement that he might 
consider joining me if I made clear that we were implying no 
view with respect to stops by state and local officers for 
such purposes as checking driver's licenses, auto registration, 
weighing trucks or enforcing agricultural quarantines. I 
attach a proposed new footnote to be added to Brignoni-Ponce. 
I do not know whether this will satisfy Bill. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
Footnote 8, for p. 9 in Brignoni-Ponce. (The note 
reference would appear after the word "Amendment" at 
the end of the long paragraph). 
8. Our decision is based on an assessment of 
the Border Patrol's function, its statutory authority 
for stopping vehicles, and the character of stops for 
quesioning in the border areas. We imply no view as to 
issues that may arise with respect to state and local 
law enforcement practices of stopping vehicles for such 
purposes as checking driver's licenses and auto 
registration, weighing trucks, or enforcing agricultural 
quarantines. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.p-rtntt Ofo:ttrl t1f tl{t ~tt~ .itzdtg 
Jfufringht~ J}. Of. 2ll~'!~ 
June 9, 1975 
PERSONAL 
Re: Nos. 73-2050 -United States v. Ortiz 
74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
73-6848 - Bowen v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
I'm sorry to ''let you down" on the Border Search cases. 
There is, of course, no Court opinion resolving these troublesome 
issues. And the vexing aspect of the plurality opinion in Almeida-
Sanchez is that it has been followed by an unemployment figure ex-
ceeded only by the number of illegal aliens reliably estimated to be 
in the United States. 
I argue for no nexus between the two except that they coincide. 
I add to that what I said in some dissenting opinions over the past 20 
years, that we are becoming an "impotent society. 11 With a shocking 
rise in crime, both in prosperity and recession, we are constantly --
and blandly-- telling the society we serve "you can't get there from 
here.'' 
Here, as elsewhere, the key lies in the irrational, monolithic, 
mechanical application of the Suppression Doctrine, fulfilling Cardozo's 
prophecy on it once a month if not more. 
You have my vote on the Border cases if you link it with a sane, 
selective use of exclusion -- as in Engl"fd, Israel, and every other 
civilized country in the world save ours. 
Mr. Justice Pow ell 
CHAMBERS OF 
.hprtmt Q}ottriltf t!rt ~h .itatt• 
-ufri:ttgbm. ~. (!}. 2ll~'!..;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 9, 1975 
Re: No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz 
No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
Dear Lewis: 
I am still unable to join your proposed opinions 
for these cases. I remain where I was at the time of our 
conference. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
C HAM BERS O F 
.Su.prtmt Q}tturlttf tJrt ~tlt $5tzdtg 
... ufringbm. ~. Q}. 2ll&f~~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 10, 1975 
Re: No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz 
Dear Brethren: 
I have already confided to you, at greater length than 
you probably thought was desirable, my thoughts in connection 
with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. I would suggest a 
somewhat similar approach in Ortiz. I think the same considera-
tions apply, and that we would accomplish something if we 
could get some changes in Lewis' present draft which would 
save in substance, as well as in form, the question of the 
validity of a stop at a fixed checkpoint. To this end, I 
would propose the following changes: 
(1) An addition to go after the last 
sentence in present footnote 1, page 3, 
to make it clear that the description of 
inspec ~on~ontained in the first sentence 
of that footnote does not necessarily mean 
that every such inspect1on is a "search"~ 
for example, I would think if a car is law-
fully stopped, the Border Patrol officer 
might lie on the ground and look under the 
chassis without that action constituting 
a search: 
"To the extent that the various 
facets of such inspections constitute 
'searches' for purposes of the Fourth 
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Amendment, we held in Almeida-Sanchez, 
supra, that when conducted by roving 
patrols away from the border they are 
subject to a requirement of probable 
cause." 
(2) A replacement for the present sentence 
on page 4, beginning on the seventh line 
from the bottom, in order to draw a sharper 
distinction between a stop and a search: 
"While these differences between a 
roving patrol and a checkpoint would 
have a good deal of significance in 
determining the propriety of the stop, 
which is a far lesser intrusion than 
a search, Terry v. Ohio, supra, they do 
not appear to make any difference in 
the search itself. The greater regularity 
attending the stop does not mitigate 
the invasion of privacy that a search 
entails." 
(3) A replacement for the two consecutive 
sentences beginning on the fifth line £rom 
the bottom of page 5 and ending on the fourth 
line from the top of page 6, in order to 
focus the Fourth Amendment analysis of this 
case on the evils of a search under these 
conditions, and not on a more generalized 
concept of Fourth Amendment rights which 
could include a stop as well: 
"The imperative of the Fourth Amendment 
is that a law enforcement officer's 
- 3 -
reasons for breaching a citizen's 
protected privacy in conducting a 
search must be judged against an 
objective standard." 
Again, I not only do not know your respective reactions 
to these proposals, but I know nothing of Lewis' reactions. 
If, mirabile dictu, they should prove agreeable to all 
concerned, I would suggest a separate concurring statement 
in Ortiz something like that which I suggested in Brignoni-
Ponce. 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Sincerel~ 
(k0 
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Honorable Edward A. Infante, Magistrate, U. s...-District Court for 
the Southern District of California, requesting a warrant to keep 
open its checkpoint at San Clemente, California. After reviewing 
the affidavits of two Border Patrol officers, and examining the 
facts set forth in United States v. Baca, 25 relating to the need to 
maintain such checkpoints, Magistrate Infante issued a Warrant of 
Inspection. This warrant, which was issued June 22, 1974, gave 
the Border Patrol the authority: 
( 1) to conduct an immigration traffic checkpoint on the 
northbound lanes of Interstate Route 5, five miles south of 
San Clemente, California, and; 
(2) to stop northbound motor vehicles for the purpose of 
making routine inquiries to determine the nationality andfor 
immigration status of the occupants of said vehicles, and; 
(3) to conduct routine inspection of said vehicles for . the 
presence of aliens, . . . 2 6 • r 
Magistrate Infante also included in the warrant certain record 
keeping requirements relating to the number of vehicles passing 
the checkpoint, the number stopped, the number inspected,' and 
the number of aliens discovered, together with a recapitulation 
of the number of deportable aliens apprehended. The warrant 
with the information required was to be returned within ten days. 







The checkpoint was operated for a total of 124 hours 
and ten minutes during which 145,960 vehicles passed 
through the checkpoint; 
802 vehicles were stopped at the checkpoint for ques-
tioning; 
202 vehicles were inspected; 
Aliens were found in 171 vehicles; 
725 deportable aliens were apprehended in vehicles 
stopped at this checkpoint; 
25. 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973). After the Almeida-Sanchez deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit consolidated several cases and remanded them to the Dis-
trict Court for consideration in light of that decision. After a lengthy factual 
analysis, it was the conclusion of the District Court that searches at the San Cle-
mente checkpoint and other checkpoints were border searches for immigration 
purposes. The Baca opinion provides an excellent factual analysis of the illegal 
alien problem. · 
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F. No property was seized.27 
Since June 22, 197 4, similar warrants have been issued to the 
Border Patrol by several of the District Court Judges in the 
Southern District of California. Magistrate Infante has also con-
tinued to issue such warrants. However, these warrants do not 
give the Border Patrol authority "to conduct routine inspection of 
said vehicles for the presence of aliens .... "28 Under the new 
warrants the Patrol's authority is limited to stopping vehicles for 
routine inquiry concerning nationality. Any search of an automo-
bile must then be based upon independent facts learned by the 
officer that would be sufficient to constitute probable cause. 
Operating under the June 22, 1974, warrant, the Patrol 
stopped and searched_ a car driven by Amado Martinez-Fuerte 
through the San Clemente checkpoint. 29 The car carried two per-
sons who admitted to being in the country illegally. The driver 
was arrested, charged and convicted of inducing entry and trans-
portation of two illegal aliens into the United States. The case 
is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and among the questions 
submitted for review is the constitutionality of the warrant. 30 
According to Justice Powell, a constitutional warrant would 
be one issued after due consideration of a number of relevant fac-
tors. In Almeida-Sanchez he wrote: 
Although the standards .for probable cause in the context of 
this case are relatively unstructured ... there are a number of 
relevant factors which merit consideration: they include (i) 
the frequency with which aliens illegally in · the country are 
known or reasonably l?elieved to be transported within a par-
ticular area; (ii) the proximity of the area in question to the 
border; (iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics 
of the area, including the roads therein and the extent of 
their use, and (iv) the probable degree of interference with 
the rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope of 
27. ld. 
28. File No. Misc. 440, United States District Court, Southern District of 
California. Some of these warrants are also for checkpoints other than the one 
at San Clemente. Of the five Judges serving the Southern California District, two 
have held that the warta:nts are unconstitutional. One Judge has upheld the war-
rants, while another has issued such a warrant and therefore supports ·their valid-
ity. The fifth Judge has not made his position public. 
29. United States v. Amado Martinez-Fuerte, No. 74-2462 (S.D. Cal., filed 
July 9, 1974 ). 
30. United States v. Amado Martinez-Fuerte, No. 74-2462 (S.D. Cal., filed 
Aug. 27, 1974). 
.. - - ·- ----
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . 
.;§u:prrnu Q}curl of tJrt ~tb .;§tldtg 
~a:$£rington.gl. Q}. 2.0,?J-1-.;l 
June 16, 1975 
13 . 2--0)0 
Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz 
Dear Bill, Potter and Thurgood: 
You may recall that at our Conference on June 6, (when 
these cases were discussed) Bill Rehnquist indicated that if 
the opinions were clarified in certain respects, he might 
reconsider his position. 
I followed up with Bill and he identified two particular 
concerns: (i) that our opinions would not apply to state 
regulation of highway use, such as enforcement of laws with 
respect to driver's licenses, truck weights and the like; 
and (ii) that we not foreclose a different decision with 
respect to stops for questioning at established checkpoints. 
In my view, the draft opinions as circulated left open 
both of these issues, as neither was addressed. Bill, however, 
has a different view, and he rejected as inadequate some minor 
language changes I suggested. He then submitted counter-
proposals that were quite lengthy. 
As the re.sult of negotiations, I submitted the changes 
which are now reflected in the pages of Brignoni-Ponce and 
Ortiz which I enclose herewith for each of you. Without 
comm~tting himself, Bill has indicated an inclination to join 
us if we adopt these changes. Prior to seeing my counter-
proposals Bill had conferred with the Chief Justice, Byron 
and Harry with inconclusive results. I do not think my 
proposals have been seen by these gentlemen, as Bill thought 
it best to know first whether we would submit them to the 
Conference. · 
I am willing to make these changes in the draft op~n~ons . 
They certainly do not affect the result of the holdings or 
change the basic rationale. I expect all of us would come 
out at about the same place on the right of the states 
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r easonably to govern highway usage. There may be differences 
between us as to mere stops at established checkpoints. 
Although Byron expressed the view that our decision in 
» rignoni-Ponce would necessarily foreshadow a similar holding 
with respect to all other stops, I do not agree with hi~. 
In any event, the changes which are necessary to satisfy 
Bill will still leave each of us free to decide the fixed 
checkpoint stop issue as we deem proper. 
In sum, I think we have a chance now to bring these cases 
down. We will have settled conclusively the "search" issue 
at fixed checkpoints as well as by roving patrols; and we also 
will have settled the "stop" issue with respect to roving 
patrols. These decisions will go far toward resolving the 
doubt which now overhangs the entire Border Patrol operations. 
In view of time constraints as well as the importance 
of a resolution, I suggest that the four of us meet to discuss 
the situation. If agreeable, perhaps we could convene in 
Bill Brennan's office at say 11:00 a.m. today if this is 
convenient. If Mary Fowler will let Sally Smith know, she 
will advise Thurgood and Potter. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 






~ttp-umt <!fllltrl of Urt ~t~ ~hdtg 
~et$fri:ttgtott.15. <!f. 2llgtJ.1~ 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR. June 19, 1975 
Cases Held for No. 73-2050 United States v. Ortiz 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 74-5114 Larios-Montes v. United States 
Although the events in this case occurred near a check-
point, and we listed it as a hold for Ortiz, it has more in 
common with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. Officers at a 
checkpoint saw two cars turn onto the highway just north of 
them. It was shortly after midnight, no other cars had 
passed the checkpoint for some 40 minutes, and these two 
cars appeared to be traveling together. The first car, which 
had a passenger of apparent Mexican descent, slowed at the 
stop sign and turned north~ The second car "skidded" around 
the corner with no pretense of stopping. The agents saw 
three persons in the front seat and several others in the 
rear, who were apparently crouching to avoid being seen. The 
car was also riding low to the ground. The agents suspected 
that this was a "lead car-load car" type operation engaged 
in smuggling aliens. They pursued both cars and stopped them 
for questioning. Petitioner, the driver of the first car, 
was arrested when his passenger admitted to being an alien 
illegally in the country. CA9 held that the evidence obtained 
in the stop was admissible under its "founded suspicion" 
doctrine. I agree that the circumstances were sufficiently 
suspicious to support a stop for questioning, and will vote 
to deny this petition. 
No. 74-6014 Hart, Bylund, and Dixon v. United States 
No. 74-6016 Arnold v. United States 
These petitions represent two CAS judgments on two 
occurrences at the Sierra Blanca established checkpoint east 
- 2 ..:. 
of El Paso, Texas. One involved- Petitioner'Hart in 74-6014; 
the other involved Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014 
and Petitioner Arnold in 74-6016. The unusual joinder of 
· Hart, Bylund and Dixon in one petition is attributable to 
the fact that they have ·-.t9,e same lawyer. 
Petitioner Hart in 74-6014 was subjected to a routine 
search at the checkpoint ·. C~S held that checkpoint searches 
were reasonable under the Fourth Alllendment. It also seemed 
to hold, as an alternative ground, that the Sierra Blanca 
checkpoint was ·a functional equivalent of the border, although 
there is some equivocation in the opinion, suggesting that 
the panel thought that functional equivalency was just a 
factor in deciding that the circumstances · of the search were 
reasonable. United States v. Hart, S06 F.2d 887 (CAS 197S). 
As the checkpoint is 20 miles from the border, on an Inter-
state Highway, I doubt that it would be regarded as a 
functional equivalent under CA9's standard, which generally 
requires a reasonable certainty that most cars passing the 
checkpoint will have come from the border. United States v. 
Bowen, SOO F~2d 960, 96S-966 (CA9 1974). Because it is not -
clear that the "functional equivalency" discussion was meant 
as an independent ground for the decision, I will vote to 
vacate the judgment as to Petitioner Hart and remand for 
reconsideration under Ortiz. This ~ourse of action should 
. produce a clear decision from CAS on the functional equivalency 
issue. 
Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-:-6014, and Petitioner 
Arnold in 74-6016 were also stopped at the Sierra Blanca 
checkpoint~ The only issue in their case is the validity 
of the stop, as the agent's conversation with petitioners 
produced probable cause for a search. The agents at the 
checkpoint observed Petitioners' vehicle stop short of the 
checkpoint. One agent walked toward it, and the vehicle 
moved into the checkpoint. An agent then asked the occupants 
for their names, te~phoned -for a record check and obtained 
some unspecified adverse information about them. He then 
shined his flashlight through the window of the camper 
and observed what appeared to be marijuana seed. One of 
the petitioners asked the agent if he would let them go if 
they gave him their marijuana. Because this information 
surely constituted probable cause for a search, the only 
question is whether the stop was valid. I question whether 
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, since the only 
suspicious circumstances preceding it was the vehicle's 
hesitation before entering the checkpoint. Thus, this case 
' '· l 
\ 
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could present the issue reserved in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce: 
whether stops may be r:1ade at checkpoints without a basis for 
suspicion. But CAS a f firmed in this case, citing Hart and 
saying that if Hart's search was reasonable, this case was 
a fortiori. The case is_ therefore infected by the same 
ambiguity surrounding the functional equivalency holding. 
We could either vacate and remand for clarification, citing 
Ortiz and Bri~noni-Ponce, or we could grant the petitio~and 
cons~der theunctional equivalency issue, reaching the stop 
question if we conclude that this checkpoint is not a 
functional equivalent of the border. If we do grant these 
petitions,we should probably hold Hart's petition for 
disposition of the functional equivalency question. 
No. 74-6055 Evans v. United States 
This case is unique among the border-search cases. 
Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint near Oak Grove, California, 
waved Petitioners' vehicle through without stopping it. But 
as it passed, they saw two persons who appeared to be Mexicans 
-hiding in the rear floorboard. They pursued the car, at 
speeds reaching 100 miles an hour, and stopped it. Questioning 
revealed that the car contained aliens illegally in the country. 
As there was neither a stop nor a search at the checkpoint, 
the officers saw only what could have been seen by any person 
near the car, and the subsequent stop was based on reasonable 
suspicion, CA9 concluded that Petitioners' Fourth Amendment 
rights were not violated. I agree, and will vote to deny 
the petition. 
:f._.1. fl 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
ss 
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C~1::~~ad a passenger of apparent Mexican descent, slowed at the r-  jtop sign and turned north~ The second car "skidded" around 
the corner with no pretense of stopping. The agents saw 
~
ee persons in the front seat and several others in the 
. ear, who were apparently crouching to avoid being seen. The 
car was also riding low to the ground. The agents suspected 
~ ~that this was a "lead car-load car" type operation engaged 
, §Jnh. 0 in smuggling aliens. They pursued both cars and s~opp~em 
~~ for guestioning. Petitioner, the driver of the first car, 
4 ~~-· , was arres e when his passenger admitted to being an alien 
~ illegally in the country. CA9 held that the evidence obtained 
in the stop was admissible under its "founded suspicion" 
doctrine. I agree that the circumstances were sufficiently 
icious to support a stop for (fUe§'t:ionu11 ' ana wifl vote 
eny t LS pe L LOU. 
' 
Do~-~:.ew - No. k!ol~~B~ J d ~ v. United ~tates v~R 
~ .._~ No. 74-6016 Arnold -v:-Dnited States . * -- /l_ ) 
1:: ~ { ~ ~ .~a7~ --zo~~~ 
"~'" e4t•~ These pe'fttions r epresent ~wo CAS ,.j~c!gments f1n two 
__ o~urrences at the Sierra Blanca estaolLsned c1leckpoin~1 ~a~) ~1-zq-o ~~~. ~ 7~-&,61/1--(1~ 
~~&:... ~~~~ cjP. C/fs- . 'J 
4-uA--~ ~~~~-·(-e) cj// ~~~ 
~rtrf~/~~)~~~~. 
L:/lfr~' ~-~ ~!:::';  <'/~ 
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of El Paso, Texas. One involved. Petitioner · Hart in 74-6014; 
the~ involved Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74.-6014 
and Petitioner Arnold in 74-6016. The unusual joinder of 
Hart; Bylund and Dixon in one petition is attributable to 
the fact that they have ·· .t~e ~arne laW¥er. 
Petitioner Hart in 74-6014 was subjected to a routine 
search at the check oint ·. C~S held that checkpoint searches 
were reasonable un er the Fourth ~endment. It also seemed 
to hold, as an alternative ground, that the Sierra Blanca 
checkpoint was ·a functional equivalent of the border, although 
there is some equivocation in the opiniori, suggesting that 
the panel thought that functional equivalency was just a 
factor in deciding that the circumstances ' of the search were 
reasonable. United States v. Hart, S06 F.2d 887 (CAS 197S). 
As the checkpoint is 20 miles from the border, on an Inter-
state Highway, I doubt that it would be regarded as a 
functional equivalent- under CA9's standard, which generally 
requires a reasonable certainty . that most cars passing the 
checkpoint will have come from the border. United States v. 
Bowen, SOO F~2d 960, 96S-966 (CA9 1974~. Because it is not 
clear that the "functional equivalency' discussion was meant 
as an independent ground for the decision, I will vote to 
llvacate the ·udgment as to Petitioner Hart and remand for recons~aeration un er ~z. ~s course o act~on shou ld . produce a c ea ec~ ~o from CAS o~ the functional equivalency 
issue. - · Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014, and Petitioner 
Arnold in 74-6016 were also stopped at the Sierra Blanca 
checkpoint~ The onl · issue i heir case is the validity 
oj the ~p, as t e agent s conversat~on w~t pet~ ~oners 
p~obable cause for a search. The agents at the 
checkpoint observed Petitioners' vehicle stop short of the 
checkpoint. One agent walked toward it, and the vehicle 
moved into the checkpoint. An agent then asked the occupants 
for their names, te~phbned -for a record check and obtained 
some unspecified adverse information about them. He then 
shined his flashlight through the window of the camper 
and observed what appeared to be marijuana seed. One of 
the petitioners asked the agent if he would let them go if 
they gave him their marijuana. Because this information 
surely constituted probable cause for a search, the only 
question is whether the stop was valid. I question whether 
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, since the only 
suspicious circumstances preceding it was the vehicle's 
hesitation before entering the checkpoint. Thus, this case 
- 3 -
could present the issue res erved in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce: 
whether stops may be made a t checkpoints without a basis for 
suspicion. But CAS affirmed in this case, citing Hart and 
saying that if Hart's searr~h was reasonable, this case was 
a fortiori. The case is_ therefore infected by the same 
ambiguity surrounding the f unctional equivalency holding. 
We could either vacate and remand for clarification, citing 
Ortiz and Bri~noni-Ponce, or we could grant the petitio~and 
conslder theunctional equivalency issue, reaching the stop 
i 
question if we conclude that this checkpoint is not a 
functional equivalent of the border. If we do grant these 
petitions,we should probably hold Hart's petition for 
disposition of the functional equivalency question. 
No. 74-6055 Evans v. United States 
. 
This case is ~niaue among the border-search cases~ 
Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint near Oak Grove, California, 
~~ waved Petitioners' vehicle through without stopping it. But 
as it passed, they saw XW~ persons who appeared to be Mexicans 
~ -Qiding in the rear floorboard. They pursued the car, at 
~ sp~hin~ lQO miles an hour, and stopped it. Questioning 
revealed tha t =thecar cont a i ned aliens illegally in the country. 
As there was neither a stop nor a search at the checkpoint, 
~ the officers saw only what could have been seen by any person 
-~ near the car, and the subsequent stop was based on reasonable 
·(.,.(f. suspicion, CA9 concluded that Petitioners' Fourth Amendment 
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. June 19, 1975 
Cases Held for No. 74-114 U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce 
/~7~~) 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: L 
~ ~ c:J-. No. 74-993 Janney v. United States tJ-+ (f = 
1<. ~ No. 74-6150 Coffe and S arks v. United States 1 az 
J."-"1.j - :$~ ~ _,:- C ~£e.- ~ l$C'-. 
?r ~,pv'\.) These two cases are exactl . -like No. 74-6016, __ Arnold ~
v. United States, and the petition of Bylund and Dixon in ~j­
No. 74-6014, discussed in the memo of ~ases held for United  
/ 
States v. Ortiz. In each case the petitioner was stopped ~ 
at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint and, in the course of 11 ( 
question"lng, Border--Pa:l:ror officers discovered evidence v;_~ _c.-
that provided probable cause for a search. In each case ~~ 
CAS relied on its decision in Hart. If the Court wants to ~~ 
review the~tional equiva ency issue in hopes of reaching ~ 
the stop question, these cases slroaidibe held. If the Court 
vacates and remands in the other cases, I think these 
petitioners should receive the same treatment. I might 
I 
add that these Sierra Blanca cases are the only petitions 
presently before us that potentially present the issue of 
stops for questioning at checkpoints. I was in error in my 
memorandum of May 23, in suggesting that several pending 
petitions presented this issue. Our options, if we want to 
settle this remaining issue,are to p,rant one of these petitions 
despite the "functional-equivalency' hurdle, or to wait for 
a petition that presents the issue cleanly. My current 
inclination is to vacate and remand these petitions and wait. 
~) No. 74-5062 Quiroz-Reyna v. United States 
r L No. 74-5307 Baca v. United States 
These petitions involve stops conducted prior to the 
date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. None of the present 
5~~~~~~~~~ 
~? ~~~  
r?--~4 ~~i/v (? ?v'~ 
... 
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cases will decide whether the principles of Brignoni-Ponce 
should be applied retroactively. I believe, however, that 
the rationale of Peltier and the lower-court decisions prior 
to Almeida-Sanchez would lead to a conclusion that the Govern-
ment reasonably could have continued making such stops at 
least until the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. Because 
we are not deciding the retroactivity question, it would seem 
approprraee-to vacate t ese ju~ remand to the courts 
of appeals in light of Peltier, Bowen and Brignoni-Ponce, but 
I could als'o vote to deny the petitions if that is the 
consensus. 
. 4~~~~ 
The remaLnLng cases represent stopsAfor quesfi~~ing 
upheld by the courts of appeals on "reasonable sus l icion." 
In light of the decision in Brignoni-Ponc e, fne on y Lssues 
raised by these petitions will e the application of that 
stag£~ to the facts of each case. For your convenience, r;:n outline the facts in each case, and indicate how I 
intend to vote. 
}v-";vw~ ~ 
No. 74-5422 Madueno-Astorga and Lopez-Saenz \1 ~ f<, 
v. United States 
t<A...>t-o 
)f1his petition challenges two separate ingidents. In o .. ~ 
th~J:st (Madueno-Astorga), Border Patrol agents saw ~
Petiti oner's car on an Interstate Highway 10 miles from -~~ 
the border, at 6:50 a.m. They said that the car had a large 
trunk and a heavy-duty suspension system, and appeared to 
"drift" on curves. They concluded that it must be heavily 
loaded, so they stopped it. There were no other suspicious 
circumstances preceding the stop. Vacate and remand under 
Bri noni-Ponce. . ~ 
TH & econd incident (Lopez-Saenz) occurred in the early ~~ 
morning hours less than halr-a-mrle from the Mexican border, ~n~ 
in an area "heavily used by alien and narcotic smugglers." : -~ 
The officer tried to stop a Ranchero pick-up (not Petitioner's 
vehicle). It tried to run him off the road, but he finally ~ 
stopped it. The driver jumped out and fled, leaving the 1/ ct. 1_ 
pick-up in a ditch. Within 2 to 4 minutes (and before the 
officer discovered that the pick-up contained marijuana), ~ 
another Ranchero pick-up came by. The driver (Petitioner) ~ 




SUSP,ecting it might be associated with the first vehicle, 
and found marijuana in plain view. Petitioner does not claim 
standing to challenge the stop of the first pick-up, but 
contends that there was no reasonable basis for the officer 
to suspect that he was associated with it. Deny. 
No. 74 - 6003 Alvarez-Garcia v. United States ~ 
_ Petitio~~ and a codefendant Wfr~ traveling, about 
(I) 5:15 a.m., i~losely-fol~ing ca~ear the border. They 
_ -~ w~veling slowly, an fie trai ling car dld not take 
\'LJV:~ A. opportunities to pass the leaa car. -petiti oner was a rlving ne-tead-ca~aer Patrol officers followed them and 
noticed that t~railin car was ridin low, despite new 
~~ hock absorbers. It also appeare to ave control problems 
~~ n curves, leading the officers to believe it was heavily 
oaded. The officers stopped the rear car and found --
~~marijuana, then stopped Petitioner's car, which also had 
~1 new shock absorbers but was not riding low. Deny. 
No. 74-6061 Rocha-Lopez v. United States vJ~f.( ~ 
Border Patrol officers saw Petitioner (a Mexican-American) 
at 6:40 a.m. on a road 1-1/2 miles from the border in an area 
"notorious for smuggtf"ng. Tl The officers testified that normal 
traffic at that hour is light and that they can identify most 
drivers as local residents. The did not reco nize titioner. 
When Petitioner saw the agents, e Jamme on is brakes, 2e 
reducing his speed to 10 mph. On these facts he was stopped 
Vacate and Remand. ~ 
. 3 ~ef' 
v. Uni a..~ 
I 
Border Pat officers were on patrol in a "notorious 
smuggling area" 7-1/2 miles from the border at 2:3 a.m. 
Th~ed~o fnVesf lgate an unusually-place ~ide 
the road andJS~ts, leading them to believe that 
aliens had been plcked u there. Peti lO r en rove by 
tJ 
~ 
u +- r< 
in a ontia s n o a so ten used for smuggling aliens. 
He was Mexican, a stranger to the officers, and he was 
traveling 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. They followed him for 
a short distance and stopped him. Vacate and remand. 
- 4 -
No. 74-6259 Gonzales v. United States 
A Border Patrol officer was on patrol at 5:20 a.m. 
1-1/2 miles from the border on a road that parallels the 
Rio Grande. The area between the highway and the river is 
sparsely populated and is often used by smugglers. The 
officer saw Petitioner's truck top a levee, coming from the 
border, and turn its headlights on. The officer became 
suspicious and signaled the vehicle to stop. Petitioner 
tried to run him off the road, but the officer finally 
succeeded in stopping the truck. Deny. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
ss 
... 
C "*' S£RS OF 
THE CH I EF JUSTICE 
.§u:prmtt ~tntri of tfrt ~b .$>tafts 
~Mlpnghm. ~. ~· 2DgT;l!;~ 
June 23, 1975 
Re: No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz 
Dear Bill: 
/ 
Please show me as joining your concurrence 
but I may join only the judgment, thereby limiting my 
~ concurrence. 
I will act as soon as Lewis' "whole package" 
is clear to me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM BERS O F 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~up-:rtmt C!fcurl uf tq.t ~ttittb ~htftg 
~lUltittgtctt.lB. C!f. 2!lbi~.;l 
June 26, 1975 
Re: No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz 
No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni- Ponce 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your opinion concurring in the judgment. 
I am also joining Byron. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~U:Vrtlttt ~ttttrl ~f tqt 'Jjtttittlt .§htftg 
2.tufrhtgtcu:. ~. ~· 211bt'!-.;l 
June 26, 197 5 
Re: No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz 
No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni- Ponce 
Dear Byron: 
If it is all right with you, please join me in your op1mon 
concurring in the judgment. I am also joining the Chief. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
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Cases Held for No. 73-6848 Bowen v. U.S. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Some of the petitions raise other issues, 
regard any of them as important enough for our 
In No. 73-6923, two other persons have filed a 
the petition. My recorcs show that we have not 
motion. · 
but I do not 
consideration. 
motion to join 
acted on this 
~~/ 
No. 74-599 United States v. Speed and Rainer  
~?¥ 
CAS reversed respondents' convictions for smuggling ~A? 
marijuana found in their trunk at a checkpoint search conducted 
* C£1-oc/1-.s-~~~





before Almeida-San ·~hez. In a decision rendered after Almeida-
Sanchez the court concluded that its pre-Almeida-Sanchez law 
required at least a "reasonable suspicion" of illegal activity 
for a checkpoint s~arch. My analysis of the Fifth Circuit cases 
in Bowen convinced me that CAS had never rejected its early 
cases affirming the Border Patrol's authority to search cars 
at checkpoints without any basis for suspicion. Bowen slip 
op. at 3 n. 1. On that basis I concluded that the Border 
Patrol reasonabl relied on that recedent, in CA~ as well 
as o er c~rcuits, ~n con uct~ng c ec]?<)int searches prior 
to Almeida-Sanchez. The search in this case occurred at a 
"temporary" checkpoint rather than a permanent installation, 
but that factor makes no difference under either CAS's prior 
law, see United States v. Wright, 476 Fo2d 1027 (1973), or 
Peltier and Bowen. I will therefore vote to grant the 
Government's petition and reverse, citing Bowen. 
1_.-f (J 
L. FoP o, Jr. 
ss 
-
C HAMBERS O F 
.jttpTtntt <!fcuri ttf tlft ~t~ ;itaftg 
Jlasftington. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t~~ 
..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR. June 19, 1975 
Cases Held for No. 73-2050 United States v. Ortiz 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 74-5114 Larios-Montes v. United States 
Although the events in this case occurred near a check-
point, and we listed it as a hold for Ortiz, it has more in 
common with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. Officers at a 
checkpoint saw two cars turn onto the highway just north of 
them. It was shortly after midnight, no other cars had 
passed the checkpoint for some 40: minutes, and these two 
cars appeared to be traveling together. The first car, which 
had a passenger of apparent Mexican descent, slowed at the 
stop sign and turned north. The second car "skidded" around 
the corner with no pretense of stopping. The agents saw 
three persons in the front seat and several others in the 
rear, who were apparently crouching to avoid being seen. The 
car was also riding low to the ground. The agents suspected 
that this was a "lead car-load car" type operation engaged 
in smuggling aliens. They pursued both cars and stopped them 
for questioning. Petitioner, the driver of the first car, 
was arrested when his passenger admitted to being an alien 
illegally in the country . CA9 held that the evidence obtained 
in the stop was admissible under its "founded suspicion" 
doctrine. I agree that the circumstances were sufficiently 
suspicious to support a stop for questioning, and will vote 
to deny this petition. 
No. 74-6014 Hart, Bylund, and Dixon v. United States 
No. 74-6016 Arnold v. United States 
These petitions represent two CAS judgments on two 
occurrences at the Sierra Blanca established checkpoint east 
... .,. 
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of El Paso, Texas. One involved Petitioner Hart in 74-6014; 
the other involved Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014 
and Petitioner Arnold in 74-6016 .. The unusual joinder of 
Hart, Bylund and Dixon in one petition is attributable to 
the fact that they have the same lawyer. 
Petitioner Hart in 74-6014 was subjected to a routine 
search at the checkpoint. CAS held that checkpoint searches 
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It also seemed 
to hold, as an alternative ground, that the Sierra Blanca 
checkpoint was a functional equivalent of the border, although 
there is some equivocation in the opinion, suggesting that 
the panel thought that functional equivalency was just a 
factor in deciding that the circumstances of the search were 
reasonable. United States v. Hart, S06 F.2d 887 (CAS 197S). 
As the checkpoint is 20 miles from the border, on an Inter-
state Highway, I doubt that it would be regarded as a 
functional equivalent under CA9's standard, which generally 
requires a -reasonable certainty that most cars passing the 
checkpoint will have come from the border. United States v. 
Bowen, SOO F.2d 960, 96S-966 (CA9 1974). Because Lt is not 
clear that the "functional equivalency" discussion was meant 
as an independent ground for the decision, I will vote to 
vacate the judgment as to Petitioner Hart and remand for 
reconsideration under Ortiz. This course of action should 
produce a clear decision from CAS .on the functional equivalency 
issue. 
Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014, and Petitioner 
Arnold in 74-6016 were also stopped at the Sierra Blanca 
checkpoint. The only issue in their case is the validity 
of the stop, as the agent's conversation with petitioners 
produced probable cause for a search. The agents at the 
checkpoint observed Petitioners' vehicle stop short of the 
checkpoint. One agent walked toward it, and the vehicle 
moved into the checkpoint. An agent then asked the occupants 
for their names, te~phoned . for a record check and obtained 
some unspecified adverse information about them. He then 
shined his flashlight through the window of the camper 
and observed what appeared to be marijuana seed. One of 
the petitioners asked the agent if he would let them go if 
they gave him their marijuana. Because this information 
surely constituted probable cause for a search, the only 
question is whether the stop was valid. I question whether 
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, since the only 
suspicious circumstances preceding it was the vehicle's 
hesitation before entering the checkpoint. Thus, this case 
- 3 -
could present the issue reserved in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce: 
whether stops may be made at checkpo~nts without a basis for 
suspicion. But CAS affirmed in this case, citing Hart and 
saying that if Hart's search was reasonable, this case was 
a fortiori. The case is therefore infected by the same 
ambiguity surrounding the functional equivalency holding. 
We could either vacate and remand for clarification, citing 
Ortiz and Brifnoni-Ponce, or we could grant the petitio~and 
cons~der theunctional equivalency issue, reaching the stop 
question if we conclude that this checkpoint is not a 
functional equivalent of the border. If we do grant these 
petitions,we should probably hold Hart's petition for 
disposition of the functional equivalency question. 
No. 74-6055 Evans v. United States 
This case is unique among the border-search cases. 
Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint near Oak Grove, California, 
waved Petitioners' vehicle through without stopping it. But 
as it passed, they saw two persons who appeared to be Mexicans 
hiding in the rear floorboard. They pursued the car, at 
speeds reaching 100 miles an hour, and stopped it. Questioning 
revealed that the car contained aliens illegally in the country. 
As there was neither a stop nor a search at the checkpoint, 
the officers saw only what could have been seen by any person 
near the car, and the subsequent stop was based on reasonable 
suspicion, CA9 concluded that Petitioners' Fourth Amendment 
rights were not violated. I agree, and will vote to deny 
the petition. 
~.1. fl. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
ss 
June 19, 1975 
cases Held for No. 73-2050 United States v. Ortiz 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 74-5114 Larios-MOates v. United States 
Although the events in this case occurred near a check-
point, and we listed it as a hold for Ortiz, it has more in 
common with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. Officers at a 
checkpoint saw two cars turn onto the highway just north of 
them. It was shortly after midnight, no other cars had 
passed the checkpoint for some 40rrsninutas, and these two 
cars appeared to be traveling together. The first car, which 
had a passenger of apparent Mexican descent, slowed at the 
stop sign and turned north. The second car "skidded" around 
the comer with no pretense of stopping.. The agents saw 
three persons in the front seat and several others in the 
rear, who were apparently crouching to avoid being seen. The 
car was also riding low to the ground. The agents suspected 
that this was a "lead car-load car" type operation engaged 
in smuggling aliens. They pursued both cars and stopped them 
for questioning. Petitioner, the driver of the first car, 
was arrested when his passenger admitted to being an alien 
tllegally in the country! CA9 held that the evidence obtained 
in the stop was admissib e under its "founded suspicion" 
doctrine. I agree that the circumstances were sufficiently 
suspicious to support a stop for questioning, and will vote 
to deny this petition. 
No. 74-6014 Hart, Bylund, and Dixon v. United States 
No. 74-6016 Arnold v. United States 
These petitions represent two CAS judgments on two 





of El Paso, Texas. One involved Petitioner Bart in 74-6014; 
the other involved Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014 
and Petitioner Arnold in 74-6016. The unusual joinder of 
Hart, Bylund and Dixon in one petition is attributable to 
the fact that they have the same lawyer. 
Petitioner Hart in 74-6014 was subjected to a routine 
search at the checkpoint. CAS held that checkpoint searches 
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It also seemed 
to hold, as an alternative ground, that the Sierra Blanca 
checkpoint was a functional eQuivalent of the border, although 
there is some equivocation in the opinion, suggesting that 
the panel thought that functional equivalency was just a 
factor in deciding that the circumstances of the search were 
reasonable. United States v. Hart, S06 F.2d 887 (CAS 197S). 
As the checkpo!Dt is 2o Dliles from the border, on an Inter-
state Highway, I doubt that it would be regarded as a 
functional equivalent under CA9' s standard, which generally 
requires a reasonable certainty that most cars passing the 
checkpoint will have come from the border. United States v. 
Bowen, SOO F.2d 960, 96S-966 (CA9 1974~. Because it is not 
clear that the "functional equivalency' discussion was meant 
as an independent ground for the decision, I will vote to 
vacate the judgment as to Petitioner Hart and remand for 
reconsideration under Ortiz. This course of action should 
produce a clear decision from CAS on the functional equivalency 
issue. 
Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014, and Petitioner 
Arnold in 74-6016 were also stopped at the Sierra Blanca 
checkpoint. The only issue in their ease is the validity 
of the stop, as the agent's conversation with petitioners 
produced probable cause for a search. The agents at the 
checkpoint observed Petitioners' vehicle stop short of the 
checkpoint. One agent walked toward it, and the vehicle 
moved into the checkpoint. An agent then asked the occupants 
for their names, telephonedfor a record check and obtained 
some unspecified adverse information about them. He then 
shined his flashlight through the window of the camper 
and observed what appeared to be marijuana seed. One of 
the petitioners asked the agent if he would let them go if 
they gave htm their marijuana. Because this information 
surely constituted probable cause for a search, the only 
question is whether the stop was valid. I question whether 
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, since the only 
suspicious circumstances preceding it was the vehicle's 
hesitation before entering the checkpoint. Thus, this case 
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could present the issue reserved in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce: 
Whether stops may be made at checkpoints without a basis for 
suspicion. But CAS affirmed in this case, citing ~ and 
saying that if Hart's search was reasonable, this case was 
a fortiori. The case is therefore infected by the same 
ambiguity surrounding the functional equivalency holding. 
We could either vacate and remand for clarification, citing 
Ortiz and Brifnoni-Ponce, or we could grant the petitiomand 
consider tbeUnctional equivalency issue, reaching the stop 
question if we conclude that this checkpoint is not a 
functional equivalent of the border. If we do grant t1He"e:e 
petition~,we should probably hold Hart's petition for 
disposition of the functional equivalency question. 
No. 74-6055 Evans v. United States 
This case is unique among the border-search cases. 
Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint near Oak Grove, California, 
waved Petitioners' vehicle through without stopping it. But 
as it passed, they saw two persons who appeared to be Mexicans 
hiding in the rear floorboard. They pursued the car, at 
speeds reaching 100 miles an hour, and stopped it. Questioning 
revealed that the car contained aliens illegally in the country. 
As there was neither a stop nor a search at the checkpoint, 
the officers saw only what could have been seen by any person 
near the car, and the subsequent stop was based on reasonable 
suspicion, CA9 concluded that Petitioners' Fourth Amendment 
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MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JusTICE BLACK-
MUN joins, concurring in the judgment. 
Given Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 
( 1973), with which I disagreed but which is now authori-
tative , the results reached in these cases were largely 
foreordained. The Court purports to leave the ques-
tion open, but it seems to me, my Brother REHNQUIST 
notwithstanding, that under the Court's opinions check-
point investigative stops, without search, will be difficult 
to justify under the Fourth Amendment absent probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion. In any event, the Court 
has thus dismantled major parts of the apparatus by 
which the Nation has attempted to intercept millions of 
aliens who enter and remain illegally in this country. 
The entire system, however, has been notably unsuc-
cessful in deterring or stemming this heavy flow; and its 
costs. including added burdens on the courts, have been 
substantial. Perhaps the judiciary should not strain to 
accommodate the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the needs of a system which at best can demon-
strate only minimal effectiveness as long as it is lawful 
.::; . -
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for business firms and others to employ aliens who are 
illegally in the country. This problem, which ordinary 
law enforcement has not been able to solve, essentially 
poses questions of national policy and is chiefly the busi~ 
ness of Congress and the Executive Branch rather than 
the courts. 
I concur in the result in these two cases. 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 73-2050 
United States, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
· v. United States Court of Ap-
Luis Antonio Ortiz. peals for the Ninth Circuit. 
[May -, 1975] 
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL. 
Border Patrol officers stopped respondent's car for a 
routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on 
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on 
November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed 
in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three 
counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the 
country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, 
relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v. 
Bowen, 500 F . 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, post p. -, 
to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), required probable 
cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether 
conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints. 
We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 824 (1974). 
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border Patrol 
officers had any special reason to suspect that respond-
ent's car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does the 
Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint 
is a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for the 
United States, at 16. The only question for decision is 
whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpomts, like the 
roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchl~z, must be based 
on probable cause. 
-
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I 
In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's con-
tention that the Nation's strong interest in controlling 
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the 
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both 
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving 
patrols near the border. The facts did not require us to 
decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic check-
points, which differ from roving patrols in several impor-
tant respects. 413 U. S., at 273; id., at 276 (MR. JusTICE 
PowELL, concurring). 
A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress in 
this and similar cases produced an extensive factual 
record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern 
California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD 
Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62 air miles 
and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is 
on the principal highway between San Diego and Los 
Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint 
in a year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,- F. 2d 
-, - (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca 
described the checkpoint's operation as follows : 
"Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating 'All Vehicles, Stop 
Ahead, 1 Mile.' Three-quarters of a mile further 
north are two black on yellow signs suspended over 
the highway with flashing lights stating 'Watch for 
Brake Lights.' At the checkpoint, which is also the 
location of a State of California weighing station1 
are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended 
over the highway. These signs each state 'Stop 
Here-U. S. Officers.' Placed on the highway are 
a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into 
two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in ful1 dress 
73-2050-MEMO (A) 
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uniform, standing behind a white on red 'Stop' sign 
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes 
are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flash-
ing red light-8. In addition, there is a permanent 
building which houses the Border Patrol office and 
temporary detention facilities. There are also flood-
lights for nighttime operation." 368 :F'. Supp., at 
410-411. 
The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this check-
point in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy 
traffic, and personnel shortages keep it closed about one-
third of the time. When it is open, officers screen all 
northbound traffic. If anything about a vehicle or its 
occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carry-
ing aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants 
about their citizenship. ·If the officer's suspicion persists, 
or if the questioning enhances it, he will "inspect" por-
tions of the car in which an alien might hide.,_ Opera-
tions at other checkpoints are similar, although the 
traffic at some is light enough that officers can stop all 
vehicles for questioning and routinely inspect more of 
them. 
The Government maintains that these characteristics 
justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic check-
points despite the Court's holding in Almeida-Sanchez. 
It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that 
case. First, a checkpoint officer's discretion in deciding 
1 Such places typically include the trunk, under the hood, and 
beneath the chassis. If the vehicle is a truck, a camper, or the 
like, the officer inspects the enclosed portion as well . But an immi-
gration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez, 
the officer removed the back seat cusluon because there were reportg 
that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which 
the springs had been removed, 413 U. S., at 286 (WHITE, J ., 
dissenting), 
73-2050-MEMO (A) 
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which cars to search is limited by the location of the 
checkpoint. That location is determined by high-level 
Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include the 
degree 3f ·inconvenience to the public and the potential 
for safe operation, as well as the potential for detecting 
and deterring the illegal movement of aliens. By con-
trast, officers on roving pa~rol were theoretically free 
before Almeida-Sanchez to stop and seE!-rch any car within 
100 miles of the border. Second; the circumstances sur-
rounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intru-
sive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving 
patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled 
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At 
traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehi-
cles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the 
officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be fright-
ened or annoyed by the intrusion. 
These differences are relevant to the constitutional 
issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment 
is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and 
oppressive interference by government officials. Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth 
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be 
reasonable also may limit police use of unnecessarily 
frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and 
investigation. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 
16-17 (1968); Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, 
at 771. The differences between a roving patrol and a 
checkpoint, however, ure primarily relevant to the rea-
sonableness of the stop rather than the search. There is 
no apparent difference in the search itself, and the 
greater regularity attending the stop does not mitigate 
the invas10n of privacy that a search entails. Nor do· 
checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the like1ihood 
'13-205G-MEMO (A) 
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of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched, 
unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reas-
sured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars 
as well. Where only a few are singled out for a search, 
as at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches 
especially offensive. See Note, Border Searches and the 
Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L. J. 1007, 1012-1013 
(1968). 
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint 
limits to any meaningful extent the officer's discretion to 
select cars for search. The record in the consolidated 
proceeding indicates that only about 3ro of the cars that 
pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either 
questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411. Through-
out the system, fewer than 3ro of the vehicles that 
passed through checkpoints in 1974 were searched, Brief 
for the United States, at 29, and no checkpoint involved 
in Baca reported a search rate of more than 10% or 
15%. 368 F. Supp., at 412-415. It is apparent from 
these figures that checkpoint officers exercise a substan-
tial degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search. 
The Government maintains that they voluntarily exer-
cise that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles 
that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers 
should be free of judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed 
realistically, this position would authorize the Border 
Patrol to search vehicles at random, for no officer ever 
would have to justify his decision to search a particular 
car. 
This degree of discretion to search private automobiles 
is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We 
stressed in Terry v. Ohio , supra, at 20-22, that the im-
perative of the Fourth Amendment is that a law en-
forcement officer's reasons for breaching a citizen's pro-
tected privacy must. be judged against an objective 
•. 
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standard. The Fourth Amendment does not tolerate 
"instrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate 
hunches," id., at 21, or the officer's subjective good faith. 
"If subjective good faith alone were the test, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evap-
orate, and the people would be 'secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discre-
tion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 97 
(1964). 
A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial in-
vasion of privacy.2 To protect that privacy from official 
arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable 
cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search. 
Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 269-270; Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1968). We are not persuaded 
that the differences between roving patrols and traffic 
checkpoints justify dispensing in this case with the safe-
guards we required in Almeida-Sanchez. We therefore 
follow that decision and hold that at traffic checkpoints 
removed from the border and its functional equivalents, 
officers may not search private vehicles without consent 
or probable cause.8 
2 The degree of the invasion of privacy in an automobile search 
may vary with the circumstances, as therP are significant differences· 
between "an automobile and ~ home or office." Chambers v. 
Maroney, 299 U. S. 42, 48 (1969); Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, supra, at 279 (PowELL, J., concurring) . 
3 We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant could issue 
approving checkpoint searches based on mformation about the area 
as a whole, in the absence of cause to believe that a particular car· 
is carrying concealed aliens, because the officers had no such warrant 
in this case and had not tried to obtain one. See Almeida-Sanchez 
v. United States, supra, at 275 (PoWELL, J., concurring); Camara 
v. Municipal Court, supra. We also need not decide whether· 
checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the same for an 
73-2050-MEMO (A) 
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The Government lists in its reply brief some of the 
factors on which officers have relied in deciding which 
cars to search. They include the number of persons in 
a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver 
and passengers, their inability to speak English, the 
responses they give to officers' questions, the nature 
of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily 
loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into 
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to 
search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note 
today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at -, 
the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences 
from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area 
and their prior experience with aliens an.d smugglers. 
In this case, however, the officers advanced no special 
reasons for believing respondent's vehicle contained 
aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search 
invalid. 
II 
The Government also contends that even if Almeida-
Sanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of 
Appeals erred in voiding this search because it occurred 
after the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before 
the Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Bowen, 
supra, that it would require probable cause for check-
point searches. Examination of the Government's brief 
in the Ninth Circuit indicates that it did not raise this 
purposes, or whether Border Patrol offirers may lawfully stoP' 
motorists for questioning at an eiitabhshed checkpoint without 
reason to believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens. 
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at -. Nor do we sug-
gest that probable cause would be reqmred for all inspections of 
private motor vehicles. It is quite possible, for example, that dif-
ferent considerations would apply to routiJ:le safety inspectiottf 
:refJ)!lired. M a conllitiou of :road m~. 
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question below. On the contrary, it represented to the 
court that the decision in Bowen would be "determina-
tive of the issues in this case." We therefore decline to 
consider this issue, which was raised for the first time 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the / 
Court. 
Border Patrol officers stopped respondent's car for a 
routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on 
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on 
November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed 
in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three 
counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the 
country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, 
relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v. 
Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, post p. -, 
to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), required probable 
cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether 
conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints. 
We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 824 (1974) . 
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border Patrol 
officers had any special reason to suspect that respond-
ent's car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does the 
Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint 
is a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for the 
United States, at 16. The only question for decision is 
whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpoints, like the 
roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based 
on probable cause. 
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I 
In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's con= 
tention that the Nation's strong interest in controlling 
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the 
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both 
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving 
patrols near the border. 'fhe facts did not require us to 
decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic check-
points, which differ from roving patrols in several impor~ 
tant respects. 413 U. S., at 273; id., at 276 (MR. JusTICE 
PowELL, concurring). 
A consolid~tted proceeding on motions to suppress in 
this and similar cases produced an extensive factual 
record· on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern 
California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD 
Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62 air miles 
and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is 
on the principal highway between San Diego and Los 
Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint 
in a year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, - F. 2d 
-, - (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca 
described the checkpoint's operation as follows: 
"Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating 'All Vehicles, Stop 
Ahead, 1 Mile.' Three-quarters of a mile further 
north are two black on yellow signs suspended over 
the highway with flashing lights stating 'Watch for 
Br~tke Lights.' At the checkpoint, which is also the 
location of a State of California weighing station, 
are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended 
over the highway. These signs each state 'Stop 
Here-U. S. Officers.' Placed on the highway are 
a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into 
two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress 
... r' 
~ 
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uniform, standing behind a white on red 'Stop' sign 
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes 
are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flash~ 
ing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent 
building which houses the Border Patrol vffice and 
temporary detention facilities. There are also flood-
lights for nighttime operation." 368 F. Supp., at 
410-411. 
The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this check-
point in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy 
traffic, and personnel shortages keep it closed about one= 
third of the time. When it is open, officers screen all 
northbound traffic. If anything about a veh\cle or its 
occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carry-
ing aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants 
about their citizenship. If the officer's suspicion persists, 
or if the questioning enhances it, he will "inspect" por~ 
tions of the car in which an alien might hide.1 Opera-
tions at other checkpoints are similar~ although the 
traffic at some is light enough that officers can stop all 
vehicles for questioning and routinely inspect more of 
them, 
The Government maintains that these characteristics 
justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic check-
points despite the Court's holding in AlmeidarSanchez, 
It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that 
case. First, a checkpoint officer's discretion in deciding 
1 Such places typically include the trunk, unde•· the hood, and 
beneath the chassis. If the vehicle i& a truck, a camper, or the 
like, the officer inspects the enclosed por4;ion as well. But an immi-
gration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez, 
the officer removed the back seat cushion because there were reports 
that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which 
the springs had been removed. 413 U. S., at 286 (W.HITE, 3., 
dissenting), 
·,: 
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which cars to search is limited by the location of the 
checkpoint. ·That location is determined by high-level 
Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include the 
degree 0f inconvenience to the public and the potential 
for safe operatiort, as well as the potential for detecting 
. and deterring the illegal movement of aliens. By con~ 
trast, officers on roving patrol were theoretically free 
· before Almeida-Sanchez to stop and search any car within 
100 miles of the border. Second, the circumstances sur'" 
rounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less jntru~ 
. sive than those attending a roving"patrol stop. Roving 
patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled 
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists" At 
traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehi~ 
cles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the 
officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be fright~ 
ened or annoyed by the intrusion. 
These differences are relevant to the constitutional 
ir:~sue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment 
is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and 
oppressive interference by government officials. Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth 
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be 
reaaonable also may limit police use of unnecessarily 
frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and 
investigation. See, e. g., 1~erry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 
16-17 ( 1968) ; Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, I>'Upra, 
at 771. The differences between a roving patrol and a 
eheckpoint, however, are primarily relevant to the rea-
sonableness of the stop rather than the search. There is 
no apparent difference in the search itself, and the 
greater regularity attending the stop does not mitigate 
the invasion of privacy that a search entails. Nor do 
checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood 
'13-2050- 0PI"N"ION 
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of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched, 
unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reas-
sured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars 
as well. Where only a few a,re singled out for a search, 
as at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches 
especially offensive. See Note, Border Se~ches and the 
Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L. J. 1007, 1012-1013 
(1968). 
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint 
limits to any meaningful e~tent the officer's discretion to 
select cars for search. The record in the consolidated 
proceeding indicates that only about 3% of the cars that 
pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either 
questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411. Through~ 
out the system, fewer than 3% of the vehicles that 
passed through checkpoints in W74 were searched, Brief 
for the United States, at 29, and no checkpoint involved 
in Baca reported a search rate of more than 10% or 
15%. 368 F. Supp., at 412-415. It is apparent from 
these figures that checkpoi~t officers exercise a substan-
tial degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search. 
The Government maintains that they voluntarily exer-
cise that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles 
that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers 
should be free of judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed 
realistically, th1s position would authorize the Border 
Patrol to search vehicles at random, for no officer evar 
would have to justify his decision to search a particular 
car. 
This degree of discretion to search private automobiles 
is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We 
stresE"ed in Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-22, that the im-
perative of the Fourth Amendment is that a law en-
forcement officer's reasons for breaching a citizen's pro~ 
tected privacy must be judged against an objective 
. ' 
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standard. The Fourth Amendment does not tolerate 
"instrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate 
hunches," id., nt 21, or the officer's subjective good faith. 
"If subjective good faith alone were the test, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evap~ 
orate, and the people would be 'secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discre-
tion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 97 
(l964). 
A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial in-
vasion of privacy.2 To protect that privacy from official 
arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable 
cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search. 
Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 269~270; Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1968). We are not persuaded 
that the differences between roving patrols and traffic 
checkpoints justify dispensing in this case with the safe-
guards we required in Almeida-Sanchez. We therefore 
follow that decision and hold that at traffic checkpoints 
removed from the border and its functional equivalents, 
officers may not search private vehicles without consent 
or probable cause.8 
2 The degree of the invasion of privacy in an automobile search 
may vary with the circumstances, as there are Slgtlificant differences 
between "an automobile and ~ home or office." Chambers v. 
Maroney, 299 U. S. 42, 48 (1969); Almeida-Sanchez v. Unitea 
States, supra, at 279 (PowELL, J., concurring). 
3 We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant could issue 
approving checkpoint searllhes based on information about the area 
as a whole, in the absence of cause to believe that a particular car 
is carrying concealed aliens, because the ufficers had no such warrant 
in this case and had not tried to obtain one. See Almeida-Sanchez 
v. United States, supra, at 275 (PoWELL, J ., concurring); Camara 
v. Municipal Court, supra We also need not decide whether 
eheckpoint~> and roving patrohs must be treatf'd. the same for all 
'' 
.. ,. ,,. ,, 
'73-2050-0PJNION 
UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ 7 
The Government lists in its reply brief some of the 
factors on which officers have relied in deciding which 
cars to search. They include the number of persons in 
a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver 
and passengers, their inability to speak English, the 
responses they give to officers' questions, the nature 
of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily 
loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into 
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to 
search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note 
today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at -, 
the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences 
from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area 
and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers. 
In this case, however, the officers advanced no special 
reasons for believing respondent's vehicle contained 
aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search 
invalid. 
II 
The Government also contends that even if Almeida-
Sanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of 
Appeals erred in voiding this search because it occurred 
after the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before 
the Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Bowen, 
supra, that it would require probable cause for check-
point searches. ExaminatiiJn of the Government's brief 
in the Ninth Circuit indicates that it did not raise this 
purposes, or whether Border Patrol officers may lawfully stop 
motorists for questioning at an established checkpoint without 
reason to believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens. 
Cf. United States v. Brign<mi-Ponce, ante, at -. Nor do we sug-
gest that probable cause would be required for all inspections of 
private moror vehicles. It is qmte possible, for example, that dif. 
ferent considerations would apply to routi1:1e safety inspection~ 
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question below. On the contrary, it represented to the 
court that the decision in Bowen would be "determina-
tive of the issues in this case." We therefore decline to 
consider this issue, which was raised for the first time 
in the petition for certiorari. 
Affirmed • 
pc/ss 5/16/75 
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ot-hc<'r-5 
Border Patrol Aagent~ stopped respondent's car for a 
routine innnigration search at the traffic checkpoint on 
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on 
November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed in 
the trunk) -.None ef theHl 'tttas ent;it;l 
States~ and respondent was convicted on three counts of 
knowingly transporting aliens who were in the country 
illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, relying 
on dictum in its opinion in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 
960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, _ante, p. ____ , to the effect that 
our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 
266 (1973), required probable cause for all vehicle searches 
in the border area, whether conducted by roving patrols 
or at traffic checkpoints. We granted certiorari. 419 
u.s. 824 (1974). 
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border 
o-f-h' ce r-s 
Patrol ~en~ had any special reason to suspect that 
2. 
respondent's car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does 
the Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint is 
a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for the 
United States, at 16. 
OV\l!,1 
The pri~~y question for decision 
is whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpoints, like 




In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's 
contention that the nation's strong interest in controlling 
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the 
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both 
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving 
LTh. e.,_ -(a cl s d i cl. ")\..-1 t re 1t.A1 " v... s +o d .t C' t' d r 1-0. k.a..tiu Jt.. +w. s~ "'u...le. w- .v.J.d a-pe~ to C:Wt:uc:D 
patrols near the bo:der. 1raffic checkpo1.ntsJ .fiffer from 
~v-r-r-. / . 
roving patrols in severalArespects. tft3 U.S,, at ;).._73; td... at .1_7fo 
(MR. 'JusncErbvJE.LLJ ~c..urn'n.g,). 
A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress 
in this and similar cases produced an extensive factual 
3 
record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern 
California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD 
Cal. 1973). The San Clemente~ checkpoint is 62 air miles 
and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is on the 
principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles, and 
over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint in a year. 
0_ ) 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, ___ F.2d ----~(CA9 1975). 
'\t. t ~ dtp&i .f J 





1 pproximately one mile south of the checkpoint is 
a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow ] 
lights over the highway stating '*'All Vehicles, Stop 
Ahead, 1 Mile.' \... Three-quarters of a mile further 
north are two black on ye1low signs sr~ended over 
the highway with flashing lights stating"'''Watch For 
Brake Lights. 't,.J-At the checkpoint, which is also the 
location of a State of California weighing station, are 
two large signs with flashing red lights suspended 
over the higlnYay. These signs each state ~'Stop 
Here-U.S. Officer~ ~ Placed on the highvmy are a 
number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into 
two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress 
uniform, standing behind a white on red1 'Stop'':'3ign 
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are 
official U.S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and tempo- l 
rary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for 
nighttime operation."- M=;_:s at: _ 3G8 F.SU-ff7 aii/M-41/. 
3A 
The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this checkpoint 
in operation ~01/lf.ww.ou.sf!d, 
~a spaR at all tiffieoJlbut bad weather, heavy traffic, and 
personnel shortages close it down about one third of the 
time. When it is open, officers screen all northbound traffic. 
If anything about a vehicle or its occupants leads an 
officer to suspect that it may be carrying aliens, he will 
stop the car and ask the occupants about their citizenship. 
If the officer's suspicion persists, or if the questioning 
enhances it, he will "inspect" the car for aliens, looking 
4. 
1 
in places where an alien might hide. t ~ 
0rU~.a"tUr1A.s at o~.JL. ~~ ~ s..~a/t) 
A.t: othet: checkpoints, where traffic permits, the -a~ent cg_ 
'dl~.g,k f-€u. -h-aff;·e a+ SoW\ e. i ~ I·~ €.A/o-OU _)1..- i{;ct- of~' CJLh5 c~ 
~ stop all vehicles for questioning and EIWi:;f :i:rl:sf3eet lfta'RYJ-
I·~s~ecf mo'('(' '1/C' ~de.s f'o~Lu. 
~~· a ~' ~· ~igh-level Border Patrol 
officials decide where to locate traffic checkpoints, 
apparently in accord with established criteria that include 
the degree of inconvenience to the public and the potential 
for safe operation, as well as the likely success in 
movement of aliens.~ 
---
The Government maintains that these characteristics 
justify dispensing with probable cause at '- traffic check-
pointsl despite the Court 1 s holding in Almeida-Sanchez. It 
' -
gives essentially two reasons for rr:~~::.B:l~i.U~~IiiWft· First, 
i 
a in deciding which cars 
he will search is limited by the location of the checkpoint. 
• 
Before Almeida-Sanchez, roving patrols were~all~ 
to stop and search any car within 100 miles of the border. 
Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and search are far less intrusive than the circumstances~ 
1 
5. 
of a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at 
night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may 
frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist 
can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see 
visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much 
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. 
These differences are relevant to the constitutional 
issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment 
is to protect e itii!lC£'1.. liberty and privacy from arbitrary 
and oppressive interference by government officials. 
~ 
Camara v. Municipal Court, A87 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The 
Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures 
po\;ce 
be reasonable may also limitAuse .of unnecessarily 
~ I# 
..:::n..~_... ..... 4tu~~-<. . ,I\ ~~ ~ -,'£ 
frightening or offensive methods ofAinvestig.ating crime. 
See, ~.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968); Camara, 
supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, at 771. The differences 
between a roving patrol a:nd a checkpoint, however, are 
primarily relevant to the reasonableness of the stop rather 
than the search. Unlike motorists who are stopped for 
questioning .) 
~HHHI~iw ~HH&HHBRiHiw~ eftly~ those who are subjected to a 
search are unlikely to be reassured by seeing that the 




singled out for a search, as at San Clemente, motorists may 
find the searches especially offensive. 
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint 
limits to any meaningful extent the g a officer's 
discretion to select cars for search. The record in the 
consolidated proceeding indicates that only about 3% 
of the cars that pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped 
for either questioning 
~ 
or a search) 368 F. Supp., at ~11 , 
~~o checkpoint reported a search rate of more than 10 or 15%. 
I4. a[ J.//J J/J5, 
~Throughout the system, fewer than 3% of the vehicles that 
passed through checkpoints in 1974 were searched. Brief 
for the United States, at 29. It is apparent from these 
figures that checkpoint officers exercise a substantial 
degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search. The 
Government maintains that they voluntarily exercise 
that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles 
that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers 
should be free of judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed 
realistically, this position would authorize the Border 
Vil-kt'des 
Patrol to search~at random, for no officer ever would 
have to justify his decision to search a particular car. 
'-'Tilis degree of J 
~~ discretion to search private automobiles is not 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-22, that the imperative of 
the Fourth Amendment 
L a law enforcementJ 
is that/ .. officer's reasons for 
~~ 
7. 
citizen's privacy must be judged against 
an objective standard. 
~~ 





~Fie] . I L 21. 
upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
};{.,j.J.. ,J--z..J ., 
JJ - / 
inarticulate hunches, 4 4~ "'A- ..., 
"If subjective good faith alone were the test, 
/'7) the protections of the Fourth Amendment would 
l--f - evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' 
only in the discretion of the police." Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964). , 
-- -LV 
-ao;f1··"' ,, 5 ii~u 
A search, even of an automobile, ~~ substantial 
2 
invasion of privacy~To protect that privacy from official 
arbitrariness , the Court always has regarded probable 
cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search. 
Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 269-270; Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 u.s. 42, 51 (1968). ha rejected the 
ide that probab 
search premises, even -
8. 






the s~e principle must I 
frJVd~re. 
;:e)\follow Almeida-Sanchez 
and hold that ... at traffic checkpoints -.. removed from 
the border and its functional.- equivalents, ~ officers 
may not search private vehicles without consent or probable 
cause.~ 
The Government listed in its reply brief some of 
the factors on which officers .._ have relied in deciding 
which cars to search. They include the number of persons in 
a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver and 
passengers, their inability to speak English, the responses 
they give to officers' questions, the nature of the 
vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily loaded. 
All of these factors .. properly • may be taken into 
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to 
search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note today 
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at ____ , the 
officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from 
these facts in light of their knowledge of the area 
/ 
and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers. 
In this m;a case, however, the officers advabced no 
special reasons for believing respondent's vehicle 
contained aliens. .. the absence of probable cause 
:=. 
makes the search invalid. 
The Government also contends that even if Almeida-
Sanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of 
because it 
Appeals erred in voiding this search ~ occurred after 
the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before the 
Court of Appeals in United States v. Bowen, 
500 F.2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, post, at ---, stated 
that it would require probable cause for checkpoint searches. 
Examination of the Government's brief in the Ninth Circuit 
a EZ&BB&B£2 indicates that it did not raise this question 
below. On the contrary, it represented to the court that 
the decision in Bowen would be "determinative of the issues 
in this case." We therefore decline to consider this issue, 
fup~~rt.~. 









1. Such places typically include the trunk, under the 
hood, and beneath the chassis, and if the vehicle is a truck, 
o~'ce12 
a camper, or the like, the Aageata- inspects the enclosed 
portion as well. But an immigration inspection is not 
off 'cell.. 
always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez, the ~removed 
i-k-a t 
the back seat cushion because there were reports ~ aliens 
~all ~~ev--
sQ~~ found seated upright behind seats from which the 
springs had been removed. 413 U.S., at 286 (dissenting 
opinion). 
~ . The substantiality of the invasion of privacy in an 
automobile search may vary with the circumstances, as 
there are significant differences between "an aut omobile 
and a home or office". Chambers v. Maroney, 299 U.S. 42, 
48 (1969); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 





and thei r prior experienc 
3 . We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant 
could issue approving checkpoint searches based on informa-
tion about the area as a whole, in the absence of cause to 
believe that a particular car is carrying concealed aliens, 
o\h'evtS 
because the ~geat~ had no such warrant for this search and 
~ieJ. 
had not s.Rugn~ to obtain one. See Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, supra, at 275 (Mr. Justice Powell, concurring); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra. We also need not decide 
whether checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the 
same for all purposes, or whether Border Patrol 
officers may lawfully stop motorists for questioning at an 
established checkpoint without reason to believe that a 
particular vehicle is carrying aliens. Cf. United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at Nor do we •••• &g 
suggest that probable cause would be required for all 
rivate_j ) ,Pv~c~ 
inspections of motor vehicles. It is quite possiblel\that / 
different considerations would apply to routine safety 
inspections required as a condition of road use. 
pc/ss 5/16/75 
No. 73-2050 UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ 
MEMORANDUM OF MR. JUSTICE POWELL. 
Border Patrol agents stopped respondent's car for a 
routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on 
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on 
November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed in 
the trunk. None of them was entitled to be in the United 
States, and respondent was convicted on three counts of 
knowingly transporting aliens who were in the country 
illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, relying 
on dictum in its opinion in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 
960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, ante, p. , to the effect that -
our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 
266 (1973), required probable cause for all vehicle searches 
in the border area, whether conducted by roving patrols 
or at traffic checkpoints. We granted . certiorari. 419 
u.s. 824 (1974). 
2. 
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border 
Patrol agents had any special reason to suspect that 
respondent's car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does 
the Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint is 
a functional eauivalent of the border. Brief for the 
United States, at 16. The primary question for decision 
is whether vehicle searches at traffic ohe.c~p01tn.t$i, like 
the roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based 
upon probable cause. 
I. 
In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's 
contention that the nation's strong interest in controlling 
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the 
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both 
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving 
patrols near the border. Traffic checkpoints differ from 
roving patrol in several respects. 
A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress 







record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern 
California. United States v. ~' 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD 
Cal. 1973). The district court described the San Clemente 
checkpoint as follows: 
'~pproximately one mile sonth of the checkpoint is 
a large black on yellow sign 'vith flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating "All Vehicles, Stop 
Ahead, 1 Mile." Three-quarters of a mile further 
north are two black on yellow signs suspended over 
the highway with flashing lights stating "Watch For 
Brake Lights." At the checkpoint, which is also the 
location of a State of California weighing station, are 
two large signs '"'ith flashing red lights suspended 
over the high"·ay. These signs each state "Stop 
Here-U.S. Officers". Placed on the highway are a 
number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into 
two lanes ·where a Border Patrol agent in full dress 
uniform, standing behind a white on red "Stop" sign 
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are 
official U.S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and tempo-
rary detention facilities. There are also floodlights f01' 
nighttime operation." Id. at •. 
When the checkpoint is in operation, officers slow 
all traffic. If anything about a vehicle or its occupants 
suggests that it may be carrying aliens, the officer will 
stop the car and ask the occupants about their citizenship. 
If the officer's suspicion persists, or if the questioning 
enhances it, he will "inspect" the car for aliens, looking 
1 
in places where an alien might hide. M· at_. 
4. 
At other checkpoints, where traffic permits, the agents 
may stop all vehicles for questioni-ng and may inspect many 
of them. Id. at ____:_, -· High-level Border Patrol 
officials decide where to locate traffic rcheekpoints, 
apparently in accord with established criteria that include 
the degree of inconvenience to ~he public and the potential 
for safe operation, as well as the likely success in 
detecting and deterring the inland movement of aliens who 
a:re-•in· the country illegally. M·, at _. 
The Government maintains that these characteristics 
justify dispensing with probable cause at a traffic check-
point despite the Court's holding in Almeida-Sanchez. It 
gives essentially two reasons for the distinction. First, 
a checkpoint agent's discretion in deciding which cars 
he will search is limited by the location of the checkpoint. 
Before Almeida-Sanchez, roving patrols were free theoretically 
to stop and search any ear within 100 miles of the border. 
Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 







of a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at 
night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may 
frighte·n motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist 
can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see 
visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much 
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. 
These differences are relevant to the constitutional 
issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment 
is to protect citizenJ liberty and privacy from arbitrary 
and oppressive interference by government officials. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 287 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The 
Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and s~izures 
be reasonable may also limit use of unnecessarily 
frightening or offensive methods . of investigating crime. 
See,~·&·, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968); Camara, 
supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, at 771. The differences 
between a roving ?atrol and a checkpoint, however, are 
pttimarily relevant to the reasonableness of the stop rather 
·;. 
6. 
than the search. Although a motorist who is stopped for 
questioning may be soothed by seeing that the Border Patrol 
requires the same information from everyone else, the 
invasion of privacy caused by a search is the same whether 
one car or a hundred are searched. Moreover, we are not 
persuaded that the checkpoint circumscribes to any meaningful• 
extent the agent's discretion to select cars for search. 
The record in the consolidated proceeding indicates that no 
more than 3% of the cars that pass the San Clemente check-
point are searched. 368 F. Supp., at ___ • 
reported a search rate of over 10 or 15%. 
No checkpoint 
Id., at - . -
It is obvious that the agents retain a substantial degree 
of discretion in deciding which cars to search. The 
Government maintains that they exercise that discretion 
reasonably and search only vehicles that arouse their 
2 
suspicion, but it insists they should be free of judicial 
oversight of any kind. Viewed ~ealistically, this position 
would give the Border Patrol license to search any car 
at all, for no agent ever would have to justify his decision 




sdarch private automobiles is inconsistent with the Fourth 
I 
A~endment, as applied in Almeida-Sanchez. 413 U.S., at 272-
' 
274; see Terry v. Qh!2, supra at 21-22. We therefore adhere 
tp Almeida-Sanchez and hold that at traffic dhe~kpdints 
I 
~emoved from the border and its functional equivale·nts, 




The Government next contends that even if Almeida-
Sanchez apples toccheckpoint searches, the Court of Appeals 
erred in voiding this search, which occurred after the 
date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before the Court 
of Appeals indicated in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 
960 (CA9 1974), aff 1d, post, at ____ , that it would require 
_..,_ ... ,_, _ _ 
\, probable cause fo~ _che~~oint __ •:ar,ehes )\The basis for \ 
\ this argument is the Government ' s contention that United\ 
I .~ \ 
\ ' I 
: States v. Bowen established "new law" in the Ninth Circui t ' ' 
t nd that the purpose'!-ro( t~e exclusionary rule would not \ 
~e served by applying that decision retroacttvely. 
I 
hJe ~ ~-Aft'"- lo C ,.1}..-vtA', d.t.Jt ,.FJ.t...-<': a .. ,(,,t,•'J..(. 
/Yto + k f)'.J.AP: t)._ t~t! l&to .. · 
', 
8. 
This analysis fails for two reasons. First, the 
Court of Appeals' opinion in Bowen announced ·no "new law". 
It simply extended the Almeida-Sanchez decision on roving 
patrols to the closely analogous facts of checkpoint searches. 
Second, the Government cannot claim that it had no notice 
that the legality of checkpoint searches was under a cloud. 
In Almeida-Sanchez the four dissenti-ng ,J'ustices indicated 
that they thought the legality of ·checkpoint searches was 
unquestioned. 413 U.S., at 288. The reasoning of the 
majority opinion, however, applied equally to checkpoint 
searches, and the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Powell expressed no view on the question. Id., at 276. 
The Government admits that the Department of Justice 
studied these opinio·ns and concluded that they did not 
squarely disapprove existing precedent in the courts of 
appeals approving checkpoint searches. The Border Patrol 
decided to c:o·ntinue relying on that precedent until it 
was expr~ssly overruled. In short, it took a calculated 
I 
risk ~hat the courts of appeal• would not be persuaded 
I 
9. 
that Almeida-Sanchez required them to overrule their 
,l 
~ 
decisions on checkpoint searches, and that a m,t]ority of 
•' 
l/' 
this Court would hold, when faced with the/ question, that 
I 








application to cases overruling its own past decisions even 
;/ 
.r 
when those decisions had long been questioned, concluding 
that in the absence of governing precedent in lower courts, 
officials may rely on this Court's decisions until we 
abandon them. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248-
251 (1969). But when the only precedent approving the 
Government's pr~ptices is in lower courts, and a decision 
of this Court raises serious question about their validity, 
we cannot conclude that a court of appeals errs when it 












1. Such places typically include the trunk, under the 
hood, and beneath the chassis, and if the vehicle is a truck, 
a camper, or the like, the agent inspects the enclosed 
portion as well. But an immigration inspection is not 
always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez, the agent removed 
the back seat cushion because there were reports of aliens 
being found seated upright behind seats from which the 
springs had been removed. 413 U.S., at 286 (dissenting 
opinion). 
2. The Government listed in its reply brief some of 
the factors on which agents commonly rely in deciding 
which cars to stop. They include the number of persons 
in a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver 
and passe·ngers, their inability to speak English, the 
responses they give to agents' questions, the natur e 
of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily 
loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into 
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to 
search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note 











• . . 
' 
B. 
the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences 
from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area 
and their prior experiences with aliens and smugglers. 
3. We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant 
could issue approving checkpoint searches based on informa-
tion about the area as a whole, in the absence of cause to 
believe that a particular car is carrying concealed aliens, 
because the agents had no such warrant for this search and 
had not sought to obtain one. See Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, supra, at 275 (Mr. Justice Powell, concurring); 





This analysis fails for two reasons. First, the 
Court of Appeals' opinion in Bowen announced no "new law". 
It simply extended the Almeida-Sanchez decision on roving 
patrols to the closely analogous facts of checkpoint searches. 
Second, the Government cannot claim that it had no notice 
that the legality of checkpoint searches was under a cloud. 
In Almeida-Sanchez the four dissenting Justices indicated 
that they thought the legality of checkpoint searches was 
unquestioned. 413 U.S., at 288. The reasoning of the 
majority opinion, however, applied equally to checkpoint 
searches, and the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Powell expressed no view on the question. Id., at 276. 
The Government admits that the Department of Justice 
studied these opinions and concluded that they did not 
I owe. I'" C.OCJ- v"t 
squarely disapprove existing" precedent =i-n- ~he eew~tts ef )-
a,~ea~ approving checkpoint searches. The Border Patrol 
decided to continue relying on that precedent until it 
was expressly overruled. In short, it took a calculated 
risk that the courts of appeals would not be persuaded 
9. 
that Almeida-Sanchez required them to overrule their 
decisions on checkpoint searches, and that a majority of 
this Court would hold, when faced with the question, that 
checkpoint searches did not require probable cause. 
lk.\s 
~ Court has refused in the past to give retroactive 
application to cases overruling its own past decisions even 
when those decisions had long been questioned, concluding 
officials may rely on this Court's decisions until we 
abandon them. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248-
251 (1969). But when the only precedent approving the 
Government's practices is in lower courts, and a decision 
of this Court raises serious question about their validity, 
we cannot conclude that a court of appeals errs when it 
gives retrospective application to a decision overruling 
its clouded cases. 
Affirmed. 
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL. 
Border Patrol officers stopped respondenes car for a 
routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on 
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on 
November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed 
in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three 
counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the 
country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, 
relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v. _ ost 
Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974) , aff'd, ~ p. -, f-.; 
to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), required probable 
cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether 
conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints. 
We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 824 (1974). 
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border Patrol 
officers had any special reason to suspect that respond-
ent's car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does the 
Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint 
is a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for the 
United States, at 16. The only question for decision is 
whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpoints, like the 
roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based 
on probable cause. 
73-2050--MEMO (A) 
2 UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ 
I 
In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's con-
tention that the Nation's strong interest in controlling 
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the 
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both 
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving 
patrols near the border. The facts did not require us to 
decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic check-
points, which differ from roving patrols in several impor-
tant respects. 413 U. S., at 273; id., at 276 (MR. JusTICE· 
PowELL, concurring). 
A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress ih 
tliis and similar cases produced an extensive factual' 
record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern 
California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD 
Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62"air miles 
and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is 
on the principal highway between San Diego and Los 
Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint 
1n a year. United States v. Martinez-F'uerte, - F. 2d 
-, - (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca 
d·escribed the checkpoint's operation as follows: 
"Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating 'All Vehicles, Stop 
Ahead, 1 Mile.' Three-quarters of a mile further 
north are two black on yellow signs suspended over 
the highway with flashing lights stating 'Watch for 
Brake Lights.' At the checkpoint, which is also the 
Iocation of a State of California weighing station, 
are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended -<L 
over the highway. These signs;eacJlstate 'Stop 
Here-D. S. Officers.' Placed on the highway are 
a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into 
two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress 
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uniform, standing behind a white on red 'Stop' sign 
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes 
~official U. S. B~der Patrol vehicles with flash-
ing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent 
building which houses the Border Patrol office and 
temporary detention facilities. There are also flood-
lights for nighttime operation." 368 F. Supp., at 
410-411. 
The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this check-
point in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy 
traffic, and personnel shortages close it down about one-
third of the time. When it is open, officers screen all 
northbound traffic. If anything about a vehicle or its 
occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carry-
ing aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants 
about their citizenship. If the officer's suspicion persists, 
or if the questioning enhances it, he will "inspect" the 
car for aliens, looking in places where an alien might 
hide.1 Operations at other checkpoints are similar, 
although the traffic at some is light enough that officers 
can stop all vehicles for questioning and inspect more 
vehicles routinely. High-level Border Patrol officials 
decide where to locate traffic checkpoints, apparently in 
accord with established criteria that include the degree 
of inconvenience to the public and the potential for safe 
operation, as well as the likely success in detecting and 
deterring the illegal movement of aliens. 
1 Such places typically include the trunk, under the hood, and 
beneath the chassis, and if the vehicle is a truck, a camper, or the 
like, the officer inspects the enclosed portion as well. But an immi-
gration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sa:nchez, 
the officer removed the back seat cushion because there were reports 
that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which 
the springs had been removed. 413 U. S., at 286 (dissenting 
opinion). 
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The Government maintains that these characteristics 
justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic check-
points despite the Court's holding in Almeida-Sanchez. 
It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that 
case. First, a checkpoint officer's discretion in deciding 
which cars he will search is limited by the location of 
the checkpoint. Before Almeida-Sanchez, roving patrols 
were theoretically free to stop and search any car within 
100 miles of the border. Second, the circumstances sur-
rounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intru-
sive than the circumstances of a roving-patrol stop. 
Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled 
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At 
traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehi-
cles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the 
bfficers' authority, and he is much less likely to be fright-
ened or annoyed by the intrusion. 
These differences are relevant to the constitutional 
1ssue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment 
l.s to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and 
oppressive interference by government officials. Camam 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth 
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be 
reasonable may also limit police use of unnecessarily 
frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and 
investigation. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 
-16-17 (1968); Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, 
at 771. The differences between a roving patrol and a 
checkpoint, however, are primarily relevant to the rea-
'sonableness of the stop rather than the search. Unlike 
motorists who are stopped for questioning, those who are 
' subjected to a search are unlikely to be reassured by 
seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well. 
Where only a few are singled out for a search, as at San 
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Clemente, motorist~ may find the searches especially 
offensive. 
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint 
limits to any meaningful extent the officer's discretion to 
select cars for search. The record in the consolidated 
proceeding indicates that only about 3ro of the cars that 
pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either 
questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411, and no 
checkpoint reported a search rate of more than 10ro or 
15%. Id., at 412-415. Throughout the system, fewer 
than 3% of the vehicles that passed through checkpoints 
in 1974 were searched. Brief for the United States, at 
'· 29. It is apparent from these figures that checkpoint 
officers exercise a substantial degree of discretion in de-
, ciding which cars to search. The Government main-
, tains that they voluntarily exercise that discretion with 
t:estraint and search only vehicles that arouse their 
suspicion, and it insists the officers should be free of 
judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed realistically, this 
position would authorize the Border Patrol to search 
vehicles at random, for no officer ever would have to 
justify his decision to search a particular car. 
This degree of discretion to search private automobiles 
is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We 
stressed in Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-22, that the im-
. perative of the Fourth Amendment is that a law en-
' forcement officer's reasons for breaching a citizen's pro-
tected privacy must be judged against an objective 
· standard. The Fourth Amendment does not tolerate 
"instrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate 
hunches," id., at 21, or the officer's subjective good faith. 
"If subjective good faith alone were the test, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evap-
orate, and the people would be 'secure in their per-
6 
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sons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discre-
tion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 97 
(1964). 
A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial in-
vasion of privacy. 2 To protect that privacy from officiai 
arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable 
cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search,. 
Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 269-270; Chambers v. Ma-· 
roney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1968). We therefore follow 
Almeida-Sanchez and hold that at traffic checkpoints re-
moved from the border and its functional equivalents, 
officers may not search private vehicles without consent 
or probable cause.3 
The Government listed in its reply brief some of the 
factors on which officers have relied in deciding which 
cars to search. They include the number of persons in 
a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver 
2 The substantiality of the invasion of privacy in an automobile 
search may vary with the circumstances, as there are significant 
differences between "an automobile and a home or office." Chambers 
v. Maroney, 299 U. S. 42, 48 (1969); Almeida-Swnchez v. United 
States, supra, at - (PowELL, J., concurring). 
3 We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant could issue 
approving checkpoint searches based on information about the area 
as a whole, in the absence of cause to believe that a particular car 
is carrying concealed aliens, because the officers had no such warrant 
for this search and had not tried to obtain one. See Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 275 (MR. JusTICE PowELL, con· 
curring); Camara v. Municipal Court, supra. We also need not 
decide whether checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the 
same for all purposes, or whether Border Patrol officers may law-
fully stop motorists for questioning at an established checkpoint 
without reason to believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens. 
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at -. Nor do we sug-
gest that probable cause would be required for all inspections of 
private motor vehicles. It is quite possible, for example, that dif-
ferent considerations would apply to routiJ:le safety inspections 
required as a condition of road use. 
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and passengers, their inability to speak English, the 
responses they give to officers' questions, the nature 
of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily 
loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into 
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to 
search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note 
today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at -, 
the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences 
from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area 
·and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers. 
In this case, however, the officers advanced no special 
reasons for believing respondent's vehicle contained 
aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search 
' invalid. 
II 
The Government also contends that even if Almeida-
Sanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of 
Appeals erred in voiding this search because it occurred 
after the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before 
the Court of Appeals in United States v. Bowen,~ i.ftt:J'f'a) 
2d 968 (OA~ lW-4-), aff'd;-1t08t, a;t~ stated that it 
would require probable cause for checkpoint searches. 
Examination of the Government's brief in the Ninth 
Circuit indicates that it did not raise this question below. 
On the contrary, it represented to the court that the de-
cision in Bowen would be "determinative of the issues 
in this case." We therefore decline to consider this 
issue, which was raised for the first time in the petition 
for certiorari. 
Affirmed. 
